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Is Climate Change a National
Emergency?
Mark P. Nevitt∗
The next decade is critical for climate action. As sea levels rise, wildfires
rage, and disasters increase in frequency and scale, it is clear that the U.S.
must leverage an expanding menu of legal, policy, and technological tools
to address climate change’s destabilizing effects. At present, we remain offtrack to reduce our collective greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions and avoid
irreversible, catastrophic harm. The emissions gap — the difference
between the world’s current emissions trajectory and what we must emit to
avoid climate change’s most severe consequences — continues to grow.
Although President Biden and the 117th congressional leadership have
pledged to combat the climate crisis, the Democrats’ narrow Senate majority
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will make passing comprehensive climate legislation difficult. In the face of
likely legislative paralysis, a diverse group of activists, policymakers, and
lawmakers have called on the president to declare climate change a national
emergency. Is climate change, and its multifaceted impacts, an emergency
that warrants using supplemental legal authorities? If so, what federal
emergency authorities are available? And what are the normative stakes to
democratic governance if a president declares a climate emergency? This
Article addresses these questions and others, arguing that climate change is
unlike any problem facing the nation and the world. As climate change
destabilizes the physical environment, it will force us to look with fresh eyes
at all the legal tools available to address climate mitigation, climate
adaptation, and how we respond to climate impacts. As such, presidents
must consider using all legal authorities, including the National
Emergencies Act (“NEA”), to address climate change.
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INTRODUCTION
The President, who is Commander in Chief and who represents the
interest of all people, must [be] able to act at all times to meet any
sudden threat to the nation’s security. A wise President will always
work with Congress, but when Congress fails to act or is unable to
act in crisis, the President, under the Constitution, must use his
powers to safeguard the nation.1
Humanity is waging war on nature. This is suicidal. Nature always
strikes back, and it is increasingly doing so with growing force and
fury . . . we must use 2021 to address our planetary emergency.2
The United States is in a state of emergency. Since the National
Emergencies Act (“NEA”) was signed into law in 1976, presidents
have declared sixty national emergencies, addressing a remarkably

1 HARRY S. TRUMAN, 2 MEMOIRS BY HARRY S. TRUMAN: YEARS OF TRIAL AND HOPE 478
(1956).
2 Andrew Freedman, Pace of Climate Change Shown in New Report Has Humanity on
‘Suicidal’ Path, U.N. Leader Warns, WASH. POST (Dec. 2, 2020, 12:16 PM EST),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/weather/2020/12/02/un-climate-report-2020-warmestyear/ [https://perma.cc/6PJK-ZLYG] (quoting U.N. Secretary General António
Guterres).
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diverse set of issues.3 Today, there are thirty-seven active
emergencies in effect, and four emergencies were declared in just the
last year.4 Because invoking emergency powers aggrandizes
executive branch authority and creates the potential for abuse, the
NEA has generated criticism and calls for reform — particularly
following President Trump’s controversial declaration of a national
emergency to construct a border wall.5
But Congress has delegated emergency authorities to the president via
the NEA, and these authorities should not be dismissed out of hand. In
2020, the President turned to the NEA to address the COVID-19
pandemic, a transnational, non-traditional threat that shares much in
common with climate change — a point highlighted by Professor Dan
Farber.6 Further, Congress grants presidents wide discretion in
determining what constitutes an emergency under the NEA’s statutory
scheme. The NEA does not expressly define “national emergency,” nor
does it provide criteria for its invocation.7
Declaring a climate emergency under the NEA serves as a “key”
that unlock several statutory “doors.” These “doors” provide legal
authorities that translate to substantive climate action. This
authority could feasibly include the immediate prohibition of
3 Today’s emergencies, among others, prohibit transactions with narco-traffickers
(Clinton Administration), block property of persons undermining democratic processes
in Zimbabwe (Bush), block the property transfer by certain transnational criminal
organizations (Obama), and secure the United States bulk-power energy supply system
(Trump). L. ELAINE HALCHIN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 98-505, NATIONAL EMERGENCY POWERS
12-17 (2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/98-505/23 [https://perma.cc/
4EV2-Z6ZS]. One active emergency has been continuously renewed and dates from the
President Carter Administration in 1979. See id. at 12.
4 Id. at 12, 14.
5 Proclamation No. 9844, Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Southern
Border of the United States, 84 Fed. Reg. 4949 (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.govinfo.gov/
content/pkg/FR-2019-02-20/pdf/2019-03011.pdf [https://perma.cc/JEF4-MXB8].
6 Proclamation No. 9994, Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Novel
Coronavirus Disease (COVID–19) Outbreak, 85 Fed. Reg. 15337 (Mar. 13, 2020),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-03-18/pdf/2020-05794.pdf [https://perma.
cc/Z2KB-ZRLN]. For a discussion of how emergency powers have been utilized in recent
years, see Daniel A. Farber, Exceptional Circumstances: Immigration, Imports, the
Coronavirus, and Climate Change as Emergencies, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 1143, 1145-46
(2020); Bruce Lindsay, Climate of Exception: What Might a ‘Climate Emergency’ Mean in
Law?, 38 FED. L. REV. 255, 267 (2010).
7 The National Emergencies Act of 1976, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651 (2018). For a
guide to emergency powers, see BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., A GUIDE TO EMERGENCY POWERS
AND THEIR USE 3-43 (2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-10/
2019_10_15_EmergencyPowersFULL.pdf [https://perma.cc/MG3B-7QYC] [hereinafter
BRENNAN CENTER].
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imports from illegally forested lands in the Amazon basin,
investment in climate-resilient infrastructure, and underwriting
investment in renewable energy and carbon–capture technology.8
While these authorities do not “solve” the climate crisis, they do offer
supplemental, substantive authorities that represent real climate
progress. Independent of the legal authorities, a climate emergency
serves as a powerful signal of the severity of the climate threat and
the need for broader action.
Given the difficulty of enacting comprehensive climate change
legislation, lawmakers have actually called on the president to use his
emergency authority.9 In this Article, I argue that climate change
requires immediate action, and emergency legal authorities provide
immediate, substantive authority that can address the current climate
crisis.10 Of course, using emergency authority to address any threat
should rightfully be scrutinized as was the case with litigation following
the recent border “emergency” in Sierra Club v. Trump.11 Yet the
decision not to use all existing authority in the face of imminent harm
must also be closely scrutinized. Witness the nation’s relatively slow
initial response to activate the NEA to address the coronavirus crisis,
delaying the provision of medical supplies.12
8

See infra Part III.
See, e.g., Coral Davenport & Lisa Friedman, The Battle Lines Are Forming in
Biden’s Climate Push, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/26/
climate/biden-climate-change.html [https://perma.cc/559S-S8Q6] (showing how multiple
authorities call on President Biden to use his emergency authority to address the climate
crisis).
10 Traditional legal authorities and a “business as usual approach” will not be
enough to address the climate crisis, a point increasingly made by climate scientists. See
Will Steffen, Johan Rockström, Katherine Richardson, Timothy M. Lenton, Carl Folke,
Diana Liverman, Colin P. Summerhayes, Anthony D. Barnosky, Sarah E. Cornell,
Michel Crucifix, Jonathan F. Donges, Ingo Fetzer, Steven J. Lade, Marten Scheffer,
Ricarda Winkelmann & Hans Joachim Schellnhuber, Trajectories of the Earth System in
the Anthropocene, 115 PNAS 8252, 8257 (2018) (stating that current targets to reduce
GHG emissions are off-track to “achieve the Stabilized Earth pathway requir[ing] a
fundamental reorientation and restructuring of national and international institutions
toward more effective governance at the Earth system level”). For an outstanding
overview of the climate science, see J.B. Ruhl & Robin Kundis Craig, 4°C, 106 MINN. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2021).
11 379 F. Supp. 3d 883 (N.D. Cal. 2019); see Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of
International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law?,
93 AM. J. INT’L L. 596, 601 (1999).
12 See, e.g., James E. Baker, Use the Defense Production Act to Flatten the Curve, JUST.
SEC. (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/69275/use-the-defense-productionact-to-flatten-the-curve/ [https://perma.cc/R52V-BYDK] (urging the government to
make use of the Defense Production Act to combat the novel coronavirus).
9
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Why is declaring climate change a national emergency potentially
justified?
First, climate change has a unique temporal nature that distinguishes
it from other complex public policy problems. GHG emissions
accumulate over time, staying in the atmosphere for decades.13 Failure
to take action today will result in massive physical destabilization
tomorrow. Despite a pandemic-induced economic slowdown, we are
failing to close the GHG emissions gap — the difference between actual
emissions and the emissions targets necessary to avoid climate change’s
most severe consequences. As GHG emissions rise, the earth warms,
and the physical environment destabilizes at an ever-increasing rate.
Extreme weather events strike with greater frequency and intensity.14
Inaction also raises the risk of climate “tipping points” and feedback
loops such as massive ice sheet devastation and irreversible coral reef
destruction.15
Even a dramatic decrease in emissions will not solve the climate
crisis overnight. Scientists are now exclaiming that transformational
action is required this decade. This is the “one shot” problem as
policymakers have a single, limited window to take action to avoid
irreversible, catastrophic harm.16 Any delay in combatting the
climate crisis hinders future legal and policy options, creating socalled climate opportunity costs.

13 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C, at 6
(Valérie Masson-Delmotte et al. eds., 2018) [hereinafter IPCC 1.5 REPORT]; U.S. GLOB.
CHANGE RSCH. PROGRAM, FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 82-83 (2018),
https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/downloads/NCA4_2018_FullReport.pdf [https://perma.
cc/UUS6-EGJ7 [hereinafter NCA4].
14 See Sarah Kaplan & Angela Fritz, Climate Change Was Behind 15 Weather
Disasters in 2017, WASH. POST (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
science/2018/12/10/climate-change-was-behind-weather-disasters/ [https://perma.cc/
576X-RKQH]. Climate change is also causing extreme heat in many parts of the United
States as seen in Portland, Oregon in June 2021. Residents in the Pacific Northwest Are
Getting Ready For Another Heat Wave, NPR (Aug. 11, 2021), https://www.npr.org/
2021/08/11/1026672403/oregon-washington-climate-change-heat-wave [https://perma.
cc/2F33-GHZJ].
15 To highlight one example, scientists estimate that ninety-nine percent of tropical
corals are projected to be lost if global temperatures rise by 2 degrees Celsius, an
increase that the world is currently on track to surpass. Steffen et al., Climate
Trajectories, supra note 10, at 8256-58 (finding that “tipping element behavior . . . are
vulnerable to tipping within just a 1 °C to 3 °C increase in global temperature”).
16 For an overview of climate change’s destructive impacts on civilization, see Kurt
M. Campbell & Christine Parthemore, National Security and Climate Change in
Perspective, in CLIMATIC CATACLYSM: THE FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY
IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 1, 12-15 (Kurt M. Campbell ed., 2008).
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Second, addressing climate change includes climate mitigation
(reducing GHG emissions) and climate adaptation (living with
climate impacts). Emergency authorities can address mitigation and
adaptation efforts, both domestically and internationally.17
Prospective domestic climate, such as the American Clean Energy
and Security Act has largely focused on climate mitigation.18 Even if
successful, these efforts are unlikely to fully address climate change’s
multivariate effects.19
Climate change also has broad implications for a wide swath of
interconnected issues such as environmental justice, economic security,
and national security. Poorer communities, for example, are already
facing climate change’s disparate impacts today and must take
adaptation measures concurrent with mitigation efforts.20
Third, climate legislation has proven elusive and the last major
environmental law passed by Congress occurred in 1990 with the
passage of the Clean Air Act amendments.21 Even in the most promising
scenario (climate legislation is passed immediately) future legislators
will be tempted to chip away at these legislative gains over time.22
Climate legislative efforts are especially vulnerable to being unraveled
over time as short-term burdens are continuously balanced against
long-term benefits.23

17 Climate change is a global collective action problem, and the U.S. contributes just
fifteen percent of worldwide emissions on an annual basis (the U.S. is the world’s largest
cumulative GHG emitter). Each Country’s Share of CO2 Emissions, UNION OF CONCERNED
SCIENTISTS (Aug. 12, 2020), https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/each-countrys-shareco2-emissions [https://perma.cc/3NJJ-HTNM].
While it is beyond the scope of this paper, international emergency authorities are
also relevant and could be invoked. See Mark Nevitt, Is Climate Change a Threat to
International Peace and Security?, 42 MICH. J. INT’L L. 527, 577-78 (2021) [hereinafter Is
Climate Change a Threat].
18 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/house-bill/2454 [https://perma.cc/UQ578W4Q].
19 And legislation runs the risk of being unraveled over time. Richard J. Lazarus,
Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future,
94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1153 (2009) (arguing that climate change “imposes costs on
the short term for the realization of benefits many decades and sometimes centuries
later”).
20 Joe McCarthy, Why Climate Change and Poverty Are Inextricably Linked, GLOB.
CITIZEN (Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/climate-change-isconnected-to-poverty/?template=next [https://perma.cc/5G2E-Z9GT].
21 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2018).
22 See Lazarus, supra note 19, at 1225-31.
23 Id. at 1153.
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To be sure, the president possesses constitutional and
administrative law authorities independent of emergency
authorities.24 Under the Clean Air Act, the EPA has the authority to
regulate carbon dioxide as an “air pollutant.”25 But these traditional
lawmaking authorities, while important, will not be enough to close
the emissions gap and avoid climate change’s irreversible and
catastrophic impacts.26
Fourth, a climate emergency declaration performs a powerful
signaling function, shifting international and national attention to
the urgency and severity of the climate crisis. It also shifts our
collective gaze back to Congress, placing legislators on notice that
follow-on emergency action may be forthcoming, particularly if
legislative paralysis continues. Rather than displacing traditional
law, emergencies authorities could be synchronized and work in
harmony with parallel, traditional legal authorities and other
efforts.27 For these reasons, this Article argues that we must look at
the full menu of legal tools available to address climate change, to
include emergency authorities.28
Of course, any emergency authority must be fully anchored in the
Constitution, statute, and historical practice. The president possesses
only the powers granted to him by the Constitution, or others delegated
to him by an act of Congress.29 This Article avoids the debate and
controversy associated with reliance on inherent Article II authorities,

24 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 14,008, 86 Fed. Reg. 7619 (Jan. 27, 2021) [hereinafter
Biden Climate Order] (providing an example of a president utilizing constitutional and
administrative law authority through executive action). This is titled “Tackling the
Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad.”
25 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 510 (2007). See generally Lazarus, supra note
19, 1221-25 (explaining how the EPA regulates carbon dioxide as an air pollutant).
26 See WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORG., UNITED IN SCIENCE 2020, at 3 (2020)
[hereinafter UNITED 2020] (calling for transformational action); see also Steffen et al.,
supra note 10, at 8257 (discussing the need for innovative action across governance
structures).
27 As Professor Farber points out, addressing climate change — a global collective
action problem — involves presidential foreign relations powers, an area where
presidential powers are comparably stronger. Farber, supra note 6, at 1169.
28 See, e.g., Jackie Flynn Mogensen, Five Things a Democratic President Could Do by
Declaring a National Emergency Over Climate Change, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 8, 2019),
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/03/what-democratic-president-could-doclimate-national-emergency/ [https://perma.cc/H8LS-LAPZ] (listing options for legal
tools that can be used to address climate change).
29 See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 53 (1987)
(explaining how the powers granted to the president must come from the Constitution
or Congress).
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instead focusing on congressionally delegated emergency powers.30
While the Constitution’s grant of emergency authority to the president
is relatively vague and its outer limits untested, Congress has already
delegated emergency powers to the president. These delegated
authorities have been widely used by all presidents to address a
remarkably diverse set of challenges.31
This Article makes three novel contributions. This is the first Article
to comprehensively connect the consensus climate science with both
traditional and emergency legal authorities. In doing so, it argues that
just as there is a GHG emissions gap, a governance gap is also emerging
that tilts the balance toward emergency action. Second, this Article
comprehensively pinpoints the exact legal authorities under the NEA
that could be operationalized to address the climate crisis, building off
Professor Dan Farber’s work in this area.32 Third, this Article addresses
both the democratic costs and substantive benefits of a climate
emergency. In doing so, this Article addresses the criticisms of a climate
emergency, contextualizing the threat posed by climate change with the
risks of tapping into emergency powers.
Part I of this Article describes the current state of climate science,
making clear that transformational action is needed today to address the
climate crisis. Failure to take transformational action today will have
catastrophic consequences in the near future. Part II explores the scope
of emergency powers, to include the President’s inherent Article II
powers as well as specific, delegated authorities under the NEA.33 Part
III analyzes how the NEA and follow-on emergency powers could be
immediately operationalized to reduce GHG emissions and invest in
climate adaptation measures.34 Part IV analyzes the challenges and
30 National Emergencies Act of 1976, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651 (2018) (utilizing a
congressionally-delegated Presidential authority to activate special powers during
crises); see also Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 12-14 (1993). For a rich literature on the scope of emergency powers, see
BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 72-75 (2010); ERIC
POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC
10 (2010). For an overview of the emergency authorities in the Constitution, see Bruce
Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1041 (2004).
31 BRENNAN CENTER, supra note 7, at 3-43.
32 Farber, supra note 6.
33 “Loose and irresponsible use of adjectives colors all non-legal and much legal
discussion of presidential powers.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 646 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
34 President Biden refers to climate change as a crisis and an emergency but has not
affirmatively declared climate change a legal emergency. Thirty nations have declared a
climate emergency under domestic law and several environmental groups have
advocated that the Biden Administration declare a climate emergency. See Dino
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opportunities in conceptualizing climate change as a national
emergency. In doing so, this Article argues that climate change upends
traditional notions of emergency. Climate change is aptly described as
the mother of all “collective action problem[s].”35 Its scope, scale, and
severity are unlike any problem facing the nation and the world. This
Article concludes by offering one possible roadmap for climate
emergency action, drawing upon contributions from climate science
and international environmental law.
I.

CLIMATE SCIENCE AND THE NEED FOR TRANSFORMATIONAL
ACTION

The science is now irrefutable: we must take transformational action
today to avoid massive physical destabilization tomorrow.36 It is
increasingly clear that climate change is an existential crisis that
requires immediate and innovative legal, technical, and policy
solutions.37 Despite a drop in global GHG emissions due to the
economic slowdown and coronavirus pandemic, the world remains offtrack to keep the earth’s temperature at a level that avoids climate
change’s irreversible and catastrophic impacts.38 We must make massive
global reductions in GHG emissions to avoid climate change’s most
Grandoni, The Energy 202: Biden Calls Climate Change an ‘Emergency.’ Now He’s Under
Pressure to Officially Declare One., WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2020, 8:36 AM EST),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/12/04/energy-202-biden-calls-climatechange-an-emergency-now-he-under-pressure-officially-declare-it-one/ [https://perma.cc/
B37K-U8AT].
35 Steven R. Brechin, Climate Change Mitigation and the Collective Action Problem:
Exploring Country Differences in Greenhouse Gas Contributions, 31 SOCIO. F. 846, 846
(2016) (describing climate change as the collective action problem of our era).
36 I borrow the term “transformational action” from the 2020 United in Science
report issued by the World Meteorological Organization in conjunction with the United
Nations, United National Environmental Program, IPCC, and other scientific and policy
experts. UNITED 2020, supra note 26, at 3; Steffen et al., supra note 10, at 8256.
37 UNITED 2020, supra note 26; see also Stephanie C. Herring, Nikolaos Christidis,
Andrew Hoell, Martin P. Hoerling & Peter A. Stott, Explaining Extreme Events of 2017
from a Climate Perspective, 100 BULL. AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y, at si, s2 (Supp. 2019),
https://doi.org/10.1175/BAMSExplainingExtremeEvents2017.1 [https://perma.cc/8YPJLA2K] (finding that sixteen of seventeen extreme weather events were made more likely
by human caused climate change); Mark Patrick Nevitt, On Environmental Law, Climate
Change, & National Security Law, 44 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 321, 323-25 (2020). Several
authors have drawn upon the latest climate science in describing the existential threats
posed by climate change. See, e.g., BILL MCKIBBEN, FALTER: HAS THE HUMAN GAME BEGUN
TO PLAY ITSELF OUT? (2019) (explaining how humans can confront the challenges
presented by climate change); DAVID WALLACE-WELLS, THE UNINHABITABLE EARTH LIFE
AFTER WARMING (2020) (using newest science to describe threats of climate change).
38 UNITED 2020, supra note 26, at 18.
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catastrophic impacts. The lack of climate progress and ongoing political
paralysis has sparked a renaissance in global climate activism. Activists
and politicians are now using emergency terminology, stating that we
are in a state of planetary emergency that demands immediate action.
Indeed, nations and localities have adopted the “climate emergency”
terminology: over thirty countries and 1,400 localities have declared a
state of climate emergency.39
Tragically, the U.S. and international communities are falling far
short of what is required to keep global temperatures at a level to avoid
irreversible devastation.40 Even if all the Paris Climate Accord goals are
met, devastating consequences will follow. Indeed, the coronavirus
crisis — and what it foreshadows for future climate action — should
serve as a climate call to action. Despite a reduction in GHG emissions
due to the pandemic-related economic slowdown, the world still did not
reduce its aggregate GHG emissions to meet the targets established by
the Paris Climate Accord.41 While any emissions reduction is welcome,
the COVID-19 crisis reinforces the finding in the most recent United in
Science report: we must take transformational action to have any chance
of placing the earth on a stabilized pathway.42
A. The Growing Climate Emissions Gap & Climate Change’s
Catastrophic Impacts
Climate scientists have released a series of sobering climate reports in
recent years, highlighting the immediacy of the climate threat. The U.S.
Fourth National Climate Assessment estimates that at certain
thresholds ice sheet disintegration will accelerate sea level rise, leading
to widespread species extinction and managed retreat.43 The U.N.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) recently
reaffirmed that the window to avoid irreversible climate impacts is
slamming shut.44

39

Grandoni, supra note 34.
Sara C. Bronin, What The Pandemic Can Teach Climate Attorneys, 72 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 155, 155 (2020).
41 UNITED 2020, supra note 26, at 18, 19.
42 Id. at 3; see also IPCC 1.5 REPORT, supra note 13, at 18.
43 NCA4, supra note 13, at 45. “Under scenarios with high emissions and limited or
no adaptation, annual losses in some sectors are estimated to grow to hundreds of
billions of dollars by the end of the century. It is very likely that some physical and
ecological impacts will be irreversible for thousands of years, while others will be
permanent.” Id. at 1347.
44 IPCC 1.5 REPORT, supra note 13, at 18.
40
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In September 2020, the World Meteorological Organization, under
the direction of the U.N. Secretary General, issued the sobering United
in Science 2020 report. United in Science 2020 reaffirmed that the world
remains far off-track to reduce international GHG emissions.45 Indeed,
the climate emissions gap — the difference between the world’s current
emissions trajectory and our emissions allocation to avoid climate
change’s most severe consequences — is growing.46 Despite increased
political and societal pressure, the emissions gap is larger than ever.47
Further, the five-year period from 2016–2020 was estimated to be the
warmest in recorded human history, with an average global mean
surface temperature of 1.1 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels.
Unless emissions decline sharply, United in Science 2020 states that
“temperature stabilization well beyond 2.0 degrees Celsius will be
unlikely.”48 Our current emissions trajectory sets us on course to a
global average temperature increase of 3.0 to 3.2 degrees Celsius (5.4 to
5.7 degrees Fahrenheit) by the end of this century.49 The emissions gap
can be bridged but “urgent and concerted action” is needed by all
countries:
It is still possible to bridge the Emissions Gap — but this will
require urgent and concerted action by all countries and across
45

UNITED 2020, supra note 26.
Id. at 18. The Paris Climate Accord has the goal of “holding the increase in the
global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing
efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.” Paris
Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art.
2(1)(a), Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104 [hereinafter Paris Accord].
47 To keep the global mean annual surface temperature below 1.5 degrees Celsius,
the gap is estimated at 29-32 Gigatonnes of carbon dioxide-equivalent (the total
combined emissions of the six largest emitters). To keep the global mean annual surface
temperature below 2.0 degrees Celsius, the Emissions Gap is estimated to be at 12-14
Gigatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO2e). IPCC 1.5 REPORT, supra note 13, at
122-24. The United Nations defines the six largest emitters as China, United States,
“EU28,” India, Russia and Japan. The United States has the highest per capita emissions
rate of the six largest emitters. Id. at 18. The 1.5-degree level is important for several
reasons; even at this level, over seventy percent of coral reefs will die and at 2.0 degrees,
ninety-nine percent of coral reefs will be lost. Id. at 8. Six million people are vulnerable
to sea level rise at a 1.5-degree Celsius increase and ten million are vulnerable at 2.0degree Celsius increase. Id.
48 UNITED 2020, supra note 26, at 7; see also Paul Voosen, Global Temperatures in
2020 Tied Record Highs, SCIENCE (Jan. 14, 2021), https://www.science.org/news/
2021/01/global-temperatures-2020-tied-record-highs [https://perma.cc/LJU7-835B].
49 UNITED 2020, supra note 26, at 18. “The findings of the [UNEP Emissions Gap
Reports] are sobering: despite scientific warnings, increased political and societal
attention and the Paris Agreement, global GHG emissions have continued to increase
and the emissions gap is larger than ever.” Id.
46
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all sectors. Looking beyond the 2030 timeframe, new
technological solutions and gradual change in consumption
patterns are needed at all levels. Transformational action can no
longer be postponed.50
The U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change
(“UNFCCC”) and 2015 Paris Climate Accord serve as the
international legal framework to reduce global GHG emissions.51 But
the Paris Accord’s framework relies heavily upon voluntary GHG
emissions reporting, so-called Nationally Determined Contributions
(“NDCs”).52 In the unlikely event that the Paris Agreement
signatories meet their commitments, the emissions gap remains. The
earth continues to warm at increasing rates. After all, GHG emissions
stay in the atmosphere for decades. Under our current level of
international climate ambition, we are on course for a global average
temperature increase of 3.0 to 3.2 degrees Celsius by the end of the
century, an increase that will have devastating impacts on human
health and the health of the planet.53
The United in Science 2020 report places the emissions gap in
increasingly dire terms. Reducing the emissions gap requires a
fundamental change in consumption patterns from all nations and
for all sectors; “no silver bullets exists and all options need to be
brought into play.”54 The global COVID-19 pandemic will “not have
a significant impact on the longer-term climate mitigation challenge,
unless the health crisis is used for reflection, and the many stimulus
and recovery initiatives are used to build back better.”55 By one
estimate, GHG emissions initially plunged seventeen percent at the
pandemic’s outset, but overall global emissions quickly rebounded
50

Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
Paris Accord, supra note 46, at art. 2.
52 Id. at art. 4.
53 The impacts are particularly cataclysmic for the world’s coral reefs, which will
decrease dramatically under this scenario. The gap under the best-case Paris scenario is
anticipated to be 15 GtCO2e for a 1.5-degree goal and 32 GtCO2e to meet the 2.0-degree
goal. UNITED 2020, supra note 26, at 18. The United in Science report places both
scenarios with a probability greater than sixty-six percent. Id.
54 Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
55 Id. at 19. Professor Hathaway and others have argued that we must learn from the
COVID-19 pandemic, and other non-traditional threats (such as climate change) should
be part of the national security paradigm. See, e.g., Oona Hathaway, Covid-19 Shows
How the U.S. Got National Security Wrong, JUST. SEC. (Apr. 7, 2020),
https://www.justsecurity.org/69563/covid-19-shows-how-the-u-s-got-national-securitywrong/ [https://perma.cc/5EQ9-RF53] (arguing that we should broaden the security
lens to include pandemics, other public health threats, and climate change).
51
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and only declined by six percent for calendar year 2020.56 Of course,
the overall concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere rose in 2020.
Indeed, the IPCC estimates that global greenhouse gas emissions
must begin falling by 7.6 percent each year to avoid climate change’s
worst effects.57 With vaccine distribution continuing and the global
economy poised to come roaring back, we would need to duplicate
the 2020 COVID-19 emissions reductions every year for an entire
decade just to have just to have a chance of meeting the Paris Accord
goals of a 1.5-degree Celsius ceiling global temperature increase
above pre-industrial norms.58
In sum, reducing GHG emissions will require addressing the
deeper, structural systems that are behind the continual rise in
worldwide GHG emissions. Transformational action could take
many forms: technological innovation, legal governance solution, or
some combination thereof. Regardless of how climate progress is
achieved, any delay in taking action imposes growing climate
opportunity costs that make it more difficult to bridge the emissions
gap in the long term.
B. Beyond Climate Mitigation: The Need for Bold Climate Adaptation
and Response Measures
Despite a temporary economic slowdown, 2020 is on track to be
one of the hottest years on record.59 And there are more GHGs in the
earth’s atmosphere than at any time in recorded human history.60

56 See Corine Le Quéré, Robert B. Jackson, Matthew W. Jones, Adam J.P. Smith,
Sam Abernethy, Robbie M. Andrew, Anthony J. De-Gol, David R. Willis, Yuli Shan,
Josep G. Canadell, Pierre Friedlingstein, Felix Creutzig & Glen P. Peters, Temporary
Reduction in Daily Global CO2 Emissions During the COVID-19 Forced Confinement, 10
NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 647, 652 (2020); Chris Mooney, Brady Dennis & John
Muyskens, Global Emissions Plunged An Unprecedented 17 Percent During The
Coronavirus Pandemic, WASH. POST (May 19, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
climate-environment/2020/05/19/greenhouse-emissions-coronavirus/ [https://perma.cc/
8TZF-24QG]; Voosen, supra note 48.
57 Mooney et al., supra note 56. This requires close to a three percent cut in global
emissions for a 2 degree Celsius target and more than seven percent per year on average
for the 1.5 degree Celsius goal. IPCC 1.5 REPORT, supra note 13, at 355.
58 If the world had started on this goal just ten years ago, the world would have only
needed to reduce emissions by 3.3% each year. Facts About Climate Emergency, UN ENV’T
PROGRAMME, https://www.unep.org/explore-topics/climate-action/facts-about-climateemergency (last visited Oct. 4, 2021) [https://perma.cc/CZ7P-YMLX].
59 See Voosen, supra note 48.
60 Greenhouse Gas Concentrations in Atmosphere Reach Yet Another High, WORLD
METEOROLOGICAL ORG. (Nov. 25, 2019), https://public.wmo.int/en/media/press-release/
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The United States is the second largest climate emitter on an
annualized basis (behind China) and the U.S. remains the world’s
largest historic emitter.61 Because climate change’s impacts are
already here, addressing climate change goes beyond just reducing
our GHG emissions (mitigation). It must also address investment in
climate resilient investment (adaptation) as well as prepare to
respond to natural disasters and extreme weather (climate response).
Consider the following examples of climate impacts as outlined in
the National Climate Assessment, IPCC, and other climate science
reports:
•

Sea-level Rise & Flood Risk: A recent joint report by Climate
Central and Zillow found that we are on a path to place 3.4
million existing homes worth $1.75 trillion in the U.S. at
increased flood risk by the end of this century — a figure made
worse by climate change.62

•

Wildfires and Extreme Weather: In Australia and the American
West, wildfires spread with increasing intensity, frequency, and
devastation. Over 10,500 structures were destroyed in California
and Oregon last year, with forty-six deaths attributed to fires
across an expanding fire zone.63 Massive wildfires destroyed the
city of Paradise, California in 2019.64 Outdated, underinvested
electric grid infrastructure combined with climate-driven weather
patterns create a volatile climate-risk cocktail.65 The IPCC’s most

greenhouse-gas-concentrations-atmosphere-reach-yet-another-high [https://perma.cc/
22WK-YJPZ].
61 See Each Country’s Share of CO2 Emissions, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS,
https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/each-countrys-share-co2-emissions (last updated
Aug. 12, 2020) [https://perma.cc/7LUY-LYBL].
62 CLIMATE CENT., OCEAN AT THE DOOR: NEW HOMES AND THE RISING SEA 2 (2019),
https://ccentralassets.s3.amazonaws.com/pdfs/2019Zillow_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
UH38-VGD6].
63 World Meterological Org., WMO-No. 1264, State of the Global Climate 2020, at
25 (2021) [hereinafter Global Climate 2020].
64 California Wildfire That Killed at Least 85 People Fully Contained, REUTERS (Nov.
25, 2018, 1:31 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-california-wildfires/californiawildfire-that-killed-at-least-85-people-fully-contained-idUSKCN1NU0A9 [https://perma.
cc/6V9V-LMBV].
65 See generally GRETCHEN BAKKE, THE GRID: THE FRAYING WIRES BETWEEN
AMERICANS AND OUR ENERGY FUTURE 10 (2016) (describing the history and current state
of the U.S. grid).
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recent report found that human influence on extreme weather
events has only strengthened in recent years.66
•

Managed Retreat: This is defined by Professor A.R. Siders as the
“purposeful, coordinat[ed] movement of people and assets out of
harm’s way.”67 Managed retreat is a forward-looking adaptation
tool that takes ex ante measures to save homes and lives. Sea level
rise and its impacts on coastal development will result in massive,
irreversible displacement of whole communities.68

These three examples showcase in stark terms that we must come to
terms with how to live with climate change’s impacts, necessitating
increased investment in climate-resilient infrastructure. Climateexacerbated impacts will result in managed retreat from climatevulnerable communities at an extraordinary scale. Diffuse climate
impacts also have broad environmental justice implications. The
poorest and most vulnerable communities lack the fewest resources
to adapt.
Finally, climate change will stress and destabilize our emergency
response legal framework as we increasingly respond to climate-driven
disasters at home and abroad.69 Advances in climate-attribution science,
which links extreme weather with climate change, demonstrates the
largely reactive nature of our federal, state, and local emergency
response framework.70 The costs of extreme weather are stunning:
Hurricane Maria — whose intensity was made worse by climate change
— inflicted over $125 billion worth of damage to Puerto Rico.
66 Jason Samwnow & Kasha Patel, Extreme Weather Tormenting the Planet Will
Worsen Because of Global Warming, U.N. Panel Finds, WASH. POST (Aug. 9, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/weather/2021/08/09/ipcc-2021-extreme-weatherclimate/ [https://perma.cc/RVD8-U5T6].
67 A.R. Siders, Managed Retreat in the United States, 1 ONE EARTH PERSP. 216, 216
(2019), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oneear.2019.09.008 [https://perma.cc/DL5G-W46G]
(describing managed retreat as the purposeful, coordinat[ed] movement of people and
assets out of harm’s way); see also Katharine J. Mach, Caroline M. Kraan, Miyuki Hino,
A.R. Siders, Erica M. Johnston & Christopher B. Field, Managed Retreat Through
Voluntary Buyouts of Flood-Prone Properties, 5 SCI. ADVANCES 1, 1 (Oct. 9, 2019),
https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/sciadv.aax8995 [https://perma.cc/T4WD-8BZR];
Digital Dialogue No. 2: Improving Flood Risk Disclosure, WHARTON RISK MGMT. &
DECISION PROCESSES CTR. (Jan. 2019), https://riskcenter.wharton.upenn.edu/digitaldialogues/improving-flood-risk-disclosure/ [https://perma.cc/5UWB-CTJN].
68 NCA4, supra note 13, at 36.
69 See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting Water Law to Public Necessity: Reframing
Climate Change Adaptation as Emergency Response and Preparedness, 11 VT. J. ENV’T L.
709, 722 (2010) (describing Governor Schwarzenegger’s response to a water shortage).
70 Herring et al., supra note 37, at s3.
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In light of these sobering climate reports what policy and legal tools
might be available? Reducing U.S. domestic GHG emissions alone does
not guarantee that other nations follow suit. Taking such action will be
insufficient to close the GHG emissions gap; GHG emissions from
developing nations may well offset any decrease in U.S. emissions.71 But
the converse is also true. If the U.S. fails to dramatically reduce its GHG
emissions, it will be virtually impossible for the emissions gap to be
bridged. As the world’s largest economy and second largest annual GHG
emitter, transformational U.S. action is a prerequisite to stabilize
worldwide GHG emissions.
While the economy will almost certainly bounce back and COVID
vaccines have emerged, the climate crisis will endure. If we simply
accept the latest peer-reviewed science that highlights both the
emission gap and our need to adapt to climate change’s impacts, what
law and policy tools might be available? In what follows, I address
the role that federal emergency law could play in addressing the
climate crisis. Tapping into emergency powers alone does not, by
itself, solve the climate crisis. It does, however, have the potential to
act as a supplemental authority to reduce our GHG emissions, invest
in climate adaptation measures, and proactively respond to climate
change’s effects.
II.

EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY TO COMBAT CLIMATE CHANGE

The President possesses a host of authorities to combat climate
change: inherent Article II emergency authorities under the
Constitution; latent, non-emergency executive authorities delegated by
Congress; and emergency authority delegated by Congress pursuant to
the NEA. I turn to each one below.
A. Congressionally Delegated, Traditional Executive Authorities
Outside of any emergency authority, the president possesses
traditional executive and administrative authorities that are critical to
address climate change. These are largely implemented via Executive
Orders and administrative rulemakings. Within the United States, the
executive branch relies upon the Clean Air Act and the EPA’s authority
to regulate GHG emissions as air pollutants.72 These are necessary,
important authorities that must be employed to reduce GHG emissions
71

Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 524-25 (2007).
Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009).
72
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at federal facilities, promote more sustainable policies in federal
procurement and acquisitions, and address leases for fossil fuel
extraction on federal lands.73 But using the full force of executive
authorities and administrative rulemaking to address climate change
has run into legal challenges.74
Reliance on traditional executive authorities does not require
legislative action but can make a substantive impact on climate
mitigation efforts. For example, the Department of Defense (“DoD”),
the world’s largest employer and largest federal agency, is an enormous
GHG emitter and fossil fuel consumer. One study recently estimated
that the U.S. military is the 55th largest GHG emitter in the world when
compared against other nations.75 The president has wide latitude to
reduce GHG emissions across the federal government — to include the
military’s reliance on fossil fuels. This can be accomplished without
turning to emergency authorities.76
These executive authorities have been used by past presidents to
address environmental, energy, and sustainability issues, but these
actions run the risk of being quickly reversed by future
Administrations. The Obama-era Climate Action Plan, for example,
mandated that every federal agency identify at risk critical
infrastructure exposed to climate impacts.77 President Obama also
73 President Biden recently directed the Secretary of Interior to “pause new oil and
natural gas leases on public lands or in offshore waters pending completion of a
comprehensive review and reconsideration of Federal oil and gas permitting and leasing
activities on public lands or in offshore waters.” Biden Climate Order, supra note 24, at 7624.
74 President Obama proposed a Clean Power Plan under the Clean Air Act. This has
been tied up in litigation, thwarting its stated goal to reduce GHG emissions. It appears
the President Biden will not revive the Clean Power Plan. See Jean Chemnick, Biden
Won’t Revive Obama’s Clean Power Plan, So Now What?, E&E NEWS (Feb. 9, 2021, 7:00
AM EST), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1063724547 [https://perma.cc/2T7K-5MQ8].
75 The U.S. Department of Defense emits more GHG emissions than many European
nations to include Portugal, Sweden, and Denmark. See NETA C. CRAWFORD, PENTAGON
FUEL USE, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND THE COSTS OF WAR 1, 2 (2019) [hereinafter COSTS OF
WAR]; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-504T, BUDGET ISSUES:
OPPORTUNITIES TO REDUCE FEDERAL FISCAL EXPOSURE THROUGH GREATER RESILIENCE TO
CLIMATE CHANGE AND EXTREME WEATHER 4 (2014) (“DoD manages a global real-estate
portfolio that includes over 555,000 facilities and 28 million acres of land with a
replacement value . . . close to $850 billion.”).
76 This was a strategy adopted by President in Obama. See e.g., Exec. Order No.
13,514, 74 Fed. Reg. 52,117 (Oct. 8, 2009) (“Federal Leadership in Environmental,
Energy, and Economic Performance”); Exec. Order No. 13,653, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,817
(Nov. 6, 2013) (“Preparing the United States for the Impacts of Climate Change”).
77 See e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,653, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,817, 66,820 (Nov. 6, 2013)
(mandating federal agencies to “identify opportunities to support and encourage
smarter, more climate-resilient investments”).
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relied upon federal agency action, rulemaking, and existing
environmental statutes — such as the Clean Air Act — to reduce
GHG emissions throughout his presidency.78 These actions were
quickly reversed by the Trump Administration, and are in the
process of being “un-reversed” by the Biden Administration.79 The
recent Biden Administration order on the climate crisis reinstated
several Obama-era executive actions, while also taking further
actions to pause oil and gas leases on public lands and prioritizing
renewable energy sources in federal procurement.80
In addition to executive actions and administrative authorities,
certain statutes grant the President non-emergency authorities that will
increase in importance as the climate crisis worsens. The Defense
Production Act (“DPA”) is one such statute. The DPA, for example, is a
recently rediscovered Cold War-era statute that was designed to harness
the industrial capacity of the United States. While the DPA was drafted
with steel, tanks, and manufacturing in mind, the DPA has been
successfully deployed throughout the COVID-19 pandemic to
accelerate the production of critical personal protective equipment.81 As
applied to climate change, the DPA could be used to extend loan
guarantees and accelerating the production for critical technology items
(such as carbon capture and sequestration).
Enacted in 1950, the DPA stated the United States “is dependent on
the ability of the domestic industrial base and services for the national
defense and to prepare for and respond to military conflicts and natural
or man-cause disasters . . . .”82 It lays out specific actions to ensure the
vitality of the domestic industrial base.83 Such actions include
protecting and restoring critical infrastructure operations and the
safeguarding of energy supplies.84 The DPA defines “national defense”
to encompass “programs for military and energy production or
construction.”85 The DPA authorizes the president to extend loan
guarantees to “critical technology items”86 and respond to industrial
78

See id. at 66,820.
See Biden Climate Order, supra note 24.
80 Id.
81 James E. Baker, Use the Defense Production Act to Flatten the Curve, JUST. SEC. (Mar.
20, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/69275/use-the-defense-production-act-to-flattenthe-curve/ [https://perma.cc/G8XH-6J5C].
82 50 U.S.C. § 4502(a)(1) (2018).
83 Id. § 4502.
84 Id. § 4502(a)(2)(C)-(D).
85 Id. § 4552(14).
86 Id. § 4531.
79
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shortfalls.87 These loan guarantees can be made to any “industrial
resource, critical technology item, or material that is essential to national
defense purposes.”88 Climate change is increasingly conceptualized as a
national security issue by a diverse group of scholars, intelligence
officials, and military officers.89
Just as the DPA was employed in an innovative manner to address the
coronavirus crisis, it could serve as a tool to address the climate crisis.
For example, DPA’s funding authorities could be employed to
underwrite renewable emergency investment and carbon capture and
sequestration technology — both high-risk/high-reward ventures in the
fight against climate change. The President must first identify critical
technology items and determine that making such loan guarantees are
essential to national defense purposes.90 Scientists and scholars are
increasingly emphasizing the role that carbon removal technologies
have in the climate crisis as well as the need to make broad shifts to
renewable energy at scale.91 Relatedly, the DPA’s authority could also
be operationalized to provide immediate loan guarantees to incentivize
the development of critical green technologies. The president could
extend loan guarantees to companies researching innovative carbon
capture and sequestration technologies or accelerating the development
of renewable energy technologies.92
The president has broad authorities under the DPA to purchase
critical technology items for government use or develop production

87

Id. § 4533.
Id. § 4531 (emphasis added). National defense is not defined within the DPA,
although the term “national security” was once used synonymously with national
defense at the time of the DPA’s passage. See generally Nevitt, supra note 37, at 328-40
(describing the relationship between these two terms).
89 See Daniel R. Coates, Off. of the Dir. of Nat’l Intel., Statement for the Record:
Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community 21-23 (2019),
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR—-SSCI.pdf [https://perma.cc/
UR7Y-CLJH].
90 For example, without a loan guarantee, credit is not available to the loan
applicant under reasonable terms or conditions to finance the activity. 50 U.S.C.
§ 4531(a)(2)(B). “National defense purposes” and “critical technology items” are also
undefined within the statute. See id.
91 See, e.g., Wendy B. Jacobs & Michael Craig, Carbon Capture and Sequestration, in
LEGAL PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 713, 713 (Michael B.
Gerrard & John C. Dernbach eds., 2019) (explaining the role of carbon capture
sequestration as a greenhouse gas emissions controller).
92 During a period of national emergency, a loan guarantee may use for “an activity
that supports the production or supply of an industrial resource, critical technology
item or material that is essential for national defense purposes.” 50 U.S.C.
§ 4531(a)(2)(A).
88
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capabilities essential for the national defense.93 Before tapping into these
authorities, the president must first make a determination that the
industrial resource, material, or critical technology is essential to the
national defense.94 The DPA could even be used to compel a company
to accept a new governmental contract to produce a product that it
otherwise does not provide. Such an authority was invoked to mass
produce ventilators and other critical health supplies during the
COVID-19 crisis. While this is a far more controversial use of the DPA’s
authority and increases the risk of litigation, tapping into these initial
authorities does not initially require an emergency declaration. As a
congressionally delegated authority, the president’s power under the
DPA’s delegated authorities may well be at its maximum, “for it includes
all that he possesses in his own right and all that Congress can
delegate.”95
Outside the DPA, the president has been granted authority to
withdraw from disposition any of the unleased lands of the Outer
Continental Shelf.96 The United States has an enormous continental
shelf with vast untapped fossil fuel resources.97 This is particularly
important for Alaska’s continental shelf in the Arctic, where climate
change is rapidly melting ice caps and renewing interest in oil and gas
extraction.98 Tapping into this authority has the potential to make a
substantive reduction in broader climate mitigation efforts.
Finally, Congress has recently given the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (“FEMA”) additional authorities to take hazard
mitigation measures prior to natural disaster striking.99 The Disaster
Recovery Reform Act (“DRRA”) was passed two years ago with a focus
on taking hazard mitigation measures prior to a major disaster
striking.100 In doing so, it expanded the type of situations where
93

50 U.S.C. § 4533(a)(5)(A).
Id.
95 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
96 43 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (2018).
97 See Hiroko Tabuchi & Tim Wallace, Trump Would Open Nearly All U.S. Waters to
Drilling. But Will They Drill?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2018/01/23/climate/trump-offshore-oil-drilling.html [https://perma.cc/WC3UFWDS].
98 Juliet Eilperin, Facing Catastrophic Climate Change, They Still Can’t Quit Big Oil,
WASH. POST (Dec. 13, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/national/
climate-environment/climate-change-alaska/ [https://perma.cc/FK24-3AZS].
99 42 U.S.C. § 5133 (2018).
100 See Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-254, § 1232, 132 Stat.
3186, 3438-69 (2018) [hereinafter FAA Reauthorization Act].
94
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mitigation assistance is available, to include wildfires and
windstorms.101 Under the DRRA, the president may set aside funds from
the Disaster Relief Fund to support pre-disaster mitigation projects.102
The DRRA also authorizes assistance to state and local governments for
building code and floodplain management administration and
enforcement. This is of particular importance for communities
attempting to update their zoning laws to take into account climate
impacts on land use planning, such as sea level rise and recurrent
flooding.103 Finally, the president is delegated specific authorities to
proactively provide fire management assistance regardless of whether a
major disaster is declared “in any area affected by a fire for which
assistance was provided . . . .”104
All of these authorities have the potential for the president to take ex
ante measures independent of an emergency or major disaster
declaration to prepare for future disasters. These traditional authorities
should be maximized prior to emergency powers being activated. They
are increasingly critical for those parts of the country that are most
prone to wildfires, recurrent flooding, and other extreme weather
events. For parts of California that suffer from annual wildfires, steps
could be taken in advance of the wildfire season to provide hazard
mitigation assistance to aggressively manage forest through the
provision of equipment and financial assistance.105 The Table below
provides a snapshot of non-emergency authorities that are increasingly
relevant to address the climate crisis.

101 Id. at 3439; see also Shannon Collins Schroeder, Comment, Does America’s New
Disaster Relief Law Provide the Relief America Needs?, 56 HOUS. L. REV. 1177, 1202 (2019).
102 42 U.S.C. § 5133(i)(1)-(3); see FAA Reauthorization Act, supra note 100.
103 Schroeder, supra note 101, at 1203.
104 42 U.S.C. § 5187(d).
105 Id. § 5187(a). And there may be even greater authority under administrative law
under national-security stylized rulemaking, an issue of increasing relevance for climate
change. But see Robert Knowles, National Security Rulemaking, 41 FLA. STATE U. L. REV.
883, 883 (2014) (criticizing “a national security administrative state that is insular and
unaccountable to the public”).
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Table A: Climate Change & Non-Emergency Authorities
Legal Authority
Defense Production
Act106
Withdrawal of
unleased lands108
Disaster Recovery
Relief Act 110
Pre-Disaster Hazard
Mitigation112
Fire Management
Assistance114

Climate Change Utilization
Investment in climate-related research and
development via federal loans and
procurement power.107
Presidential withdrawal “from disposition” of
any unleased lands on the Outer Continental
Shelf (e.g., fossil fuel extraction)109
Set aside funds from the Disaster Relief
Fund111
Pre-Disaster Mitigation Fund & Flood
Mitigation Assistance Program to assist with
prophylactic climate adaptation efforts.113
Specific authority for hazard mitigation
assistance for areas affected by wildfires.115

B. Constitutional Presidential Emergency Authorities
In addition to these non-emergency authorities, the President
possesses Article II emergency authorities.116 The outer scope of these
authorities remains untested and the subject of enormous scholarly
debate.117 The U.S. Constitution lacks a generalized emergency
provision that authorizes the suspension of traditional legal authorities
and normal government processes in the event of an emergency.118 The
term “emergency” is absent from the Constitution’s text. The most
106

50 U.S.C. § 4531 (2018).
Id. § 4533.
108 This is titled “Reservation of lands and rights” on the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands. 43 U.S.C. § 1341 (2018).
109 Id. § 1341(a).
110 FAA Reauthorization Act, supra note 100.
111 Id.
112 42 U.S.C. § 5133 (2018).
113 Hazard Mitigation Assistance, FEMA (July 12, 2021), https://www.fema.gov/
hazard-mitigation-assistance [https://perma.cc/5ERE-58VK].
114 42 U.S.C. § 5187 (2018).
115 Id. § 5187(d).
116 U.S. CONST. art. II.
117 It is beyond the scope of this Article to fully address the scope of presidential
authorities. See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585
(1952) (“The President’s power, if any . . . must stem from an act of Congress or from
the Constitution itself.”).
118 See Monaghan, supra note 30, at 33.
107
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relevant constitutional provision, the Suspension Clause, is an authority
granted to Congress, not the President.119 While inherent emergency
Article II authorities may be gleaned from the Constitution’s text via the
Vesting Clause, Take Care Clause, and Commander in Chief Clause, the
precise scope of these authorities remains murky and the subject of
immense debate and controversy.120 And the Court has at times enabled
presidential power — a point recently analyzed by Professor David
Driesen.121
Nevertheless, presidents can potentially turn to certain constitutional
emergency authorities, particularly when protecting the nation from
outside threats.122 Under the Constitution’s Vesting Clause, the
“executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States.”123
The Take Care Clause states that the President has the constitutional
obligation and authority to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed . . . .”124 Finally, the Constitution places the President as the
“Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States
. . . .”125 The military and intelligence communities increasingly make
clear that climate change is a national security threat. The military is
increasingly called upon to respond to natural disasters at home and
abroad and must defend military installations from a new “enemy”—
climate-driven sea level rise.126
But over-reliance on inherent and implied authorities — as opposed
to expressly delegated authority — poses a far greater threat to
democratic governance and civil liberties.127 The gradual expansion of

119 “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when
in cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9,
cl. 2.
120 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637; cf. Amy Stein, A Statutory National Security
President, 70 FLA. L. REV. 1183, 1204-11 (2019) (describing how presidents have been
afforded national security deference in their constitutional authorities).
121 See generally DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE SPECTER OF DICTATORSHIP: JUDICIAL ENABLING
OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER (2021) (arguing that the loss of democracy should play a role
in the Court’s jurisprudence).
122 This theory of the protective power of the presidency was first articulated by
Henry Paul Monaghan, supra note 30. See also Mark P. Nevitt, The Commander in Chief’s
Authority to Combat Climate Change, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 435, 472, 484 (2015).
123 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
124 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 646.
125 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.1.
126 See Nevitt, supra note 37, at 363-64.
127 In Youngstown, Justice Jackson was particularly dismissive of the President’s
assertion of inherent or implied powers, stating that such usage is “loose and
irresponsible . . . without fixed or ascertainable meanings.” Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 646-
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emergency power has shifted power to the executive branch since
World War II.128 While the president is afforded deference in national
security matters, broad presidential claims asserting “inherent
constitutional powers” have been rejected by the Supreme Court.129
President Truman famously advanced such a theory of emergency
power in an attempt to justify the seizure of domestic steel mills during
the height of the Korean War.130 Writing for the Supreme Court, Justice
Jackson stated, “[T]he Constitution did not contemplate that the title
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy will constitute him also
Commander in Chief of the country, its industries and its
inhabitants.”131
In addition, Professor Monaghan has argued that that there is a
narrower, inherent executive authority lurking within Article II: a
presidential protective power.132 This power is particularly relevant
when a swift response is required to face a crisis — surely the case with
climate change.133 It includes a “general authority to protect and defend
the personnel, property, and instrumentalities of the United States from
harm.”134 As applied to climate change — which clearly harms people
and property — the president could feasibly rely upon a discrete,
protective power band of Article II authorities under this proposed
protective power model. While the outer limits of the protective power
are untested, presidential protective power could feasibly be invoked to

47 (Jackson, J., concurring); see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 244 (1944)
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
128 See generally POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 30 (describing the growing role of
the Executive).
129 See, e.g., Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 659 (Burton, J., concurring) (finding that the
President does not have inherent constitutional power to seize private property when
there is no imminent invasion or threatened attack).
130 Elizabeth Goitein, Emergency Powers, Real and Imagined: How President Trump
Used and Failed to Use Presidential Authority in the COVID-19 Crisis, 11 J. NAT’L SEC. L.
& POL’Y 27, 29 (2020).
131 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 643-44 (Jackson, J., concurring).
132 Monaghan, supra note 30, at 61-70.
133 See Presidential Power to Use the Armed Forces Abroad Without Statutory
Authorization, 4A Op. O.L.C. 185, 187 (1980) (The President has “the implicit
advantage . . . over the legislature under our constitutional scheme in situations calling
for immediate action,” given that imminent national security threats and rapidly
evolving military and diplomatic circumstances may require swift response by the
United States without the opportunity for congressional deliberation and action); see,
e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (holding that the President had
congressional authority to order the transfer of Iranian assets in response to seizures of
American nationals in Iran).
134 Monaghan, supra note 30, at 11.
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protect critical national security infrastructure from extreme weather
events or take adaptation measures — such as protecting coastlines —
as poorer communities are uniquely vulnerable to sea level rise and
recurrent flooding.
Despite the Court’s skepticism toward inherent Article II emergency
authorities, Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, and Nixon all relied upon
such authorities to address diverse emergencies facing the nation.135 In
response, Congress crafted a wholesale change to the governing
emergency statutory framework with the passage of the NEA in 1976.
C. The National Emergencies Act (1976): A Statutory Tool to Declare a
Climate Emergency?
Once a president declares a national emergency under the NEA, an
emergency “master key” is handed from Congress to the president. This
key unlocks any one of the 136 “statutory doors.”136 Since the NEA’s
passage in 1976, sixty national emergencies have been declared and
there are thirty-seven active emergencies currently in place.137 While
none of these 136 implementing statutes specifically address climate
change, this Article identifies at least five relevant statutory doors that
good candidates to be opened once a national climate emergency is
declared. These statutory doors could be invoked to reduce the trade of
fossil fuel products, subsidize renewable energy technology, and invest
in climate adaptation measures at critical infrastructure.
Since the NEA was passed, national emergency declarations have
been repeatedly renewed year after year. This is true regardless of the
political party or President.138 As such, reliance upon national
emergency declarations have become increasingly normalized as a legal
tool to address an ever-expanding swath of issues. 139 In what follows, I
describe and analyze the scope of the NEA’s authorities, with a
particular focus on the five authorities that could be activated to address
the climate crisis.

135 President Nixon, for example, declared an emergency in response to a postal
strike, ordering the military to deliver mail. He also terminated international trade
agreements, pointing to Article II emergency authorities. HAROLD C. RELYEA, CONG.
RSCH. SERV., 98-505, NATIONAL EMERGENCY POWERS 1, 7 (2007).
136 See id. at 3.
137 HALCHIN, supra note 3, at 12-14.
138 See BRENNAN CENTER, supra note 7, at 7-43.
139 See Kim Lane Scheppele, Small Emergencies, 40 GA. L. REV. 835, 836-37 (2006)
(arguing that there is a new “normal” constitutional order evidenced, in part, by
America’s continual state of emergencies since the First World War).
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The National Emergencies Act’s History & Structure

The NEA delegates broad authorities to the president upon a national
emergency declaration. This statute transformed the domestic
emergency framework landscape. It was passed in the aftermath of the
Nixon Administration and sought to clarify and circumscribe
presidential emergency authority. The NEA was passed following the
1973 War Powers Resolution (“WPR”), an analogous legislative effort
designed to reinvigorate Congress’s role in national security affairs.140
The WPR placed reporting and consultation requirements on the
President prior to the entry of military forces overseas.141
The NEA successfully overhauled domestic emergency law and preexisting statutory delegations, placing existing delegations under the
NEA framework’s umbrella. Prior to the NEA’s passage, a special
congressional committee identified 470 different federal laws that
delegated emergency authority to the president as well as four existing
emergency declarations that relied upon Article II emergency
proclamations.142 The four existing emergencies included an emergency
bank holiday dating from 1933 and a Korean War emergency dating
from 1950.143 The NEA effectively reset the existing emergency
declarations and folded the 470 federal laws under one statutory
umbrella.
The NEA originally consisted of five sections (“subchapters”) to
include: (1) termination of existing emergencies; (2) declaration and
termination of future emergencies; (3) exercise of emergency powers
and authorities; (4) accounting and reporting requirements; and (5)
application to powers and authorities of other provisions of law.144
Under the first subchapter, the NEA terminated all previous
emergencies within two years of the NEA’s passage. This statutory reset
did not, however, expressly end the 1933, 1950, 1970, and 1971
140 War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50
U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548).
141 Id.
142 RELYEA, supra note 135, at 8.
143 Id. Emergencies in place included President Roosevelt’s declaration of a national
emergency that established a bank holiday in the Great Depression, President Truman’s
national emergency declaration in response to the outbreak of the Korean War, and two
national emergency declarations by President Nixon addressing currency controls and
a postal strike. S. REP. NO. 94-922, at 3 (1976); see also Patrick A. Thronson, Note,
Toward Comprehensive Reform of America’s Emergency Law Regime, 46 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 737, 739 (2013). The Korean War emergency declaration remained in effect
well after active hostilities concluded on the Korean peninsula and continued
throughout the Vietnam War. RELYEA, supra note 135, at 7-8.
144 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651 (2018).
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emergencies. But it did “return[] to dormancy the statutory authorities
they had activated, thereby necessitating a new declaration to activate
standby statutory authorities.”145
Subchapter 2 consolidated the scattered 470 emergency powers under
a single NEA umbrella, greatly reducing the range of statutes that can
be used in the event of a national emergency.146 Congress, however,
continued to delegate broad authority and discretion to the President in
making future emergency determinations. It also placed statutory
guardrails to ensure a congressional role in such decisions. Specifically,
the NEA states:
With respect to acts of Congress authorizing the exercise,
during the period of a national emergency, of any special or
extraordinary power, the President is authorized to declare such
national emergency. Such proclamation shall immediately be
transmitted to Congress and published in the Federal
Register.147
Critically, “national emergency” is not defined within the NEA
statutory scheme. In practice, this allows the President to invoke this
authority capaciously to address a remarkably diverse set of
emergencies. Once the President declares a national emergency, the
President can use “any provision[] of law conferring powers and
authorities to be exercised during a national emergency . . . .”148
Subchapter 3 mandates that the President specify the provision of law
that he is relying upon in the exercise of emergency powers. Subchapter
IV places additional reporting requirements to Congress when a
national emergency is declared, while Subchapter V carves out specific
provisions from the NEA’s reach.149 Of those 136 statutes and thirtyseven active emergencies, the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (“IEEPA”) is, by far, the most heavily relied upon
emergency authority. Today, the IEEPA is used to block the transfer of
property in numerous nations (e.g., Mali, Burundi, Zimbabwe) to
address a diverse set of problems.150

145
146
147
148
149
150

RELYEA, supra note 135, at 10.
See 50 U.S.C. § 1621 (2018).
Id. § 1621(a).
Id. § 1621(b).
See id. § 1651.
HALCHIN, supra note 3, at 12-14.
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Continual Congressional Acquiescence & the National
Emergencies Act

In seeking to reinvigorate Congress’s role in emergency decisionmaking, Congress placed three separate provisions within the NEA that
attempted to restrain the president’s delegated emergency powers. First,
Congress has the authority to terminate any emergency via a concurrent
congressional resolution.151 Second, any emergency automatically
terminates after one year if the president does not affirmatively renew it
and issue a new proclamation in the Federal Register. Third, both
Houses of Congress are required to meet every six months following an
emergency declaration to determine whether the emergency warrants
termination.152 For reasons discussed below, these statutory guardrails
have fallen short of their stated goal to check the president’s power.
First, once an emergency is declared, the follow-on authorities do not
necessarily need to relate to the underlying nature of the national
emergency.153 This orthogonal relationship between the NEA and the
implementing statutes provides broad presidential discretion. In
essence, any national emergency declaration breathes life into these 136
follow-on provisions.154
Second, Congress has largely failed to follow through and debate the
validity of national emergencies once declared. Since 1976, sixty
national emergencies have been declared and thirty-seven remain in
effect. But Congress has not met or voted on whether to end a previously
declared emergency as required by law.155 This requirement has proven
to be a statutory paper tiger, offering the appearance of congressional
engagement but falling short in its implementation. Once a national
emergency is declared, Congress quickly adjusts to the “new normal”
emergency state. A certain congressional emergency acquiescence
occurs. While emergencies automatically expire after one year,
151

50 U.S.C. § 1622.
Id. § 1622(b) (“Not later than six months after a national emergency is declared,
and not later than the end of six-month period thereafter that such emergency
continues, each House of Congress shall meet to consider a vote on a joint resolution to
determine whether that emergency shall be terminated.” (emphasis added)).
153 Elizabeth Goitein, The Alarming Scope of the President’s Emergency Powers,
ATLANTIC (Jan./Feb. 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/01/
presidential-emergency-powers/576418/ [https://perma.cc/MBM5-9CVY].
154 The Brennan Center for Justice at New York University Law School categorized
the implementation statutes to cover a wide variety of matters to include federal
personnel, asset seizure, control, and transfer, military and national defense, land
management, public health, and international relations. See BRENNAN CENTER, supra
note 7.
155 Goitein, supra note 153.
152
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presidents can unilaterally renew each emergency merely by notifying
Congress and issuing an updated proclamation posted in the Federal
Register.156 Presidents routinely renew earlier emergency declarations,
even those emergencies made by prior political opponents.157
Third, the Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in INS v. Chadha greatly
diminished Congress’s ability to end emergencies via a joint resolution
of Congress. INS v. Chadha held that concurrent resolutions — so-called
“legislative vetoes” — are unconstitutional.158 Following Chadha,
Congress has not amended the NEA to provide additional statutory
guardrails to counter the unconstitutionality of concurrent resolutions.
3.

What Qualifies as a Bona Fide Emergency Under the NEA?

The term “national emergency” is not defined within the NEA’s text,
effectively granting the President wide discretion in making any
emergency determination to address a wide variety of threats. In the
absence of a statutory definition, what could fairly be considered a bona
fide “emergency?”159
Some congressional policy experts have stated that there are at least
four aspects of an emergency condition:
The first is its temporal character: an emergency is sudden,
unforeseen, and of unknown duration. The second is its
potential gravity: an emergency is dangerous and threatening to
life and well-being. The third, in terms of governmental role and
authority, is the matter of perception: who discerns this
phenomenon? The Constitution may be guiding on this
question, but not always conclusive. Fourth, there is the
element of response . . . an emergency requires immediate
action but is, as well, unanticipated and . . . cannot always be
“dealt with according to rule.”160

156

50 U.S.C. § 1641.
As of this writing an emergency initially declared by President Carter is
approaching its 44th year of renewal. HALCHIN, supra note 3, at 12.
158 Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
159 A core rule of statutory construction states that we should construe terms to
reflect the plain meaning as understood by ordinary people.
160 RELYEA, supra note 135, at 4 (quoting EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE
AND POWERS 1787-1957, at 3 (4th ed. 1957)). The unforeseeability requirement is also
reinforced in the plain language of emergency found in dictionaries. According to the
American Heritage Dictionary, emergency is “[a]n unexpected situation or sudden
occurrence of a serious and urgent nature that demands immediate action.” Emergency,
AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 448 (2d ed. 1991).
157
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Applying the definition above, climate change is certainly a problem
of enormous gravity, and the president has been delegated authority to
make emergency determinations under the NEA. But is climate change
truly unforeseen? And are traditional authorities unable to “deal with
[climate change] according to rule?” The requirement that emergency
authorities can only be employed to respond to unexpected events is
difficult to apply to climate change. While the climate science makes
clear that climate impacts are entirely foreseeable as the GHG emissions
gap widens, the precise location, severity, timing, frequency, and
impacts of extreme weather events are unknown. We know climate
change is a problem of enormous magnitude, but its precise impacts
remain uncertain.
Further, focusing on this unforeseeability requirement is out of step
with how the NEA has been employed. This would effectively invalidate
all or most of the thirty-seven active emergencies. Many of these
emergencies have been in place for years, even decades.161 At what point
in time is an emergency no longer unforeseeable, thus requiring a
legislative response? Emergencies have been continually renewed, in
full view of Congress.162 Congress may have truly lacked time to
deliberate at an emergency’s initial declaration, but that is no longer the
case in the years following the initial declaration. Any critique of a
prospective climate emergency based upon unforeseeability grounds
must acknowledge the difficulty in applying the foreseeability test to all
other emergencies in place. Emergencies have been declared and
renewed continuously (even for decades). Indeed, what was once
unforeseeable becomes entirely foreseeable at some point in time. While
not dispositive, this “unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the
knowledge of the Congress” bolsters the President’s authority in making
an emergency determination.163
In contrast to the definition offered by scholars and dictionaries, other
relevant statutes use an entirely different emergency definition. In the
Stafford Act, a statute particularly relevant for climate impacts and
natural disaster clean-up following an extreme weather event,
emergency is broadly defined as:
161

See HALCHIN, supra note 3, at 12-14.
See id.
163 Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) (“[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents who
have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making [it] as it were such exercise of
power part of the structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive
Power’ vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.”).
162
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. . . any occasion or instance for which, in the determination of
the President, Federal assistance is needed to supplement State
and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect
property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the
threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States.164
The Stafford Act’s focus is on saving lives and protecting public health
and safety, with the goal of alleviating the effects of a threat or
catastrophic event.165 Such a definition seems ready-made for an ex ante
climate emergency under the NEA. Climate change will result in an
uptick in the frequency, magnitude, and severity of extreme weather
events that threaten life and property.
Further, many climate scientists use an entirely different definition of
emergency. In their conception of emergency, climate experts focus on
risk and urgency, de-emphasizing foreseeability.166 Urgency is defined
as the intervention time left to avoid a bad outcome.167 This is of
particular relevance for ascertaining what legal steps should be taken to
address the climate crisis. We are in a particularly critical decade to take
climate action if we have a hope to keep global temperatures below 1.52.0 degrees Celsius. In addition, catastrophic “bad outcomes” such as
climate tipping points or “green swan events” might be here soon.168 No
one truly knows. But due to the time lag inherent in climate change,

164 42 U.S.C. § 5122(1) (2018). Under the Stafford Act, “‘[m]ajor disaster’ means any
natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, winddriven
water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide,
snowstorm, or drought), or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any
part of the United States, which in the determination of the President causes damage of
sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under this
chapter to supplement the efforts and available resources of States, local governments,
and disaster relief organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering
caused thereby.” Id. § 5122(2).
165 Under U.S. domestic law, there are four emergency framework statutes: (1) The
National Emergencies Act of 1976; (2) The Public Health Service Act of 1944; (3) Robert
T. Stafford Disaster Relief Act and Emergency Act of 1988; and (4) Defense Drawdown
Act of 1961.
166 Timothy M. Lenton, Johan Rockström, Owen Gaffney, Stefan Rahmstorf,
Katherine Richardson, Will Steffen & Hans Joachim Schellnhuber, Comment, Climate
Tipping Points — Too Risky to Bet Against, 575 NATURE 592, 592-95 (2019) (“We define
emergency (E) as the product of risk and urgency. Risk (R) is defined by insurers as
probability (p) multiplied by damage (D). Urgency (U) is defined in emergency
situations as reaction time to an alert (߬) divided by the intervention time left to avoid
a bad outcome (T). Thus: E=R x U = p x D x ߬ /T”).
167 See id. at 595.
168 See id. at 592-93.
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failure to take immediate action today increases the likelihood of bad
outcomes.
Courts have generally been deferential to presidents in their exercise
of emergency authority, particularly when the President uses
congressionally-delegated emergency authorities in full view of
Congress.169 The Court did not address the question of what constitutes
an emergency in Doe v. Rumsfeld, one of the few cases challenging the
President’s authority under the NEA.170 In Center for Biological Diversity
v. Trump, a case addressing the legality of the emergency at the southern
border, the court invoked the political question doctrine when it held
that there are no judicially manageable standards for determining what
“emergency” means.171 In Sierra Club v. Trump, a lawsuit filed by an
environmental group to halt the funding of the U.S.-Mexico border wall,
the plaintiffs did not dispute that the President had properly declared a
national emergency.172 The Ninth Circuit glossed over whether the
situation at the U.S.-Mexico border was a national emergency within
the meaning of the NEA.173 Instead, the court focused on the legality of
implementing the military construction statute.174
Outside the NEA context, Professor Robin Craig has argued that we
should reframe climate change’s destabilizing impacts on natural
resources (such as water) as an emergency.175 This provides legal and
political flexibility to take action.176 Consider the following cases where
the Supreme Court has addressed the emergency exception in the
context of the regulatory takings doctrine.
In one of the few Supreme Court cases addressing what constitutes
an emergency that predate the NEA’s passage, the Court ruled that an
169 See, e.g., Doe v. Rumsfeld, 435 F.3d. 980, 986 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The Supreme
Court has recognized that under Article I, Congress has wide latitude in delegating its
powers” (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373 (1989))).
170 See id.
171 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Trump, 453 F. Supp. 3d 11, 32 (D.D.C. 2020); see
also Beacon Prods. Corp. v. Reagan, 633 F. Supp. 1191, 1194-95 (D. Mass. 1986).
172 Sierra Club v. Trump, 977 F.3d. 853, 901 n.12 (9th Cir. 2020) (“We therefore
have no occasion in this case to address the issues raised . . . as to whether the President
was correct in concluding that the situation at the southern border properly qualifies as
a ‘national emergency.’ We likewise are not presented with any issue concerning the
availability of any other emergency authority under any other statute, nor do we have
before us any possible constitutional limitations on the use of any such other
authorities.”).
173 See id. at 864 (“The NEA empowers the President to declare national
emergencies.”).
174 Id.
175 Craig, supra note 69, at 710-12.
176 Id. at 710.
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emergency is characterized by urgency and relative infrequency of
occurrence.177 An emergency is equivalent to a public calamity resulting
from a fire, flood, disaster not reasonably subject to anticipation.178
Climate scientists predict, generally, that we can reasonably anticipate
an uptick in extreme weather.179 This will lead to increased natural
disasters in both frequency and intensity. But we do not know with great
precision where to anticipate the next climate disaster.
The public necessity doctrine is also implicated in the climate
emergency discussion, particularly as it relates to the uptick in extreme
weather events.180 In United States v. Caltex, decided in 1952, the Court
ruled that “in times of imminent peril — such as when fire threatened
a whole community — the sovereign could, with immunity, destroy the
property of a few that the property of many and the lives of many more
could be saved.”181 More recently, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Commission, Justice Scalia reaffirmed the continual relevance of
emergency doctrine as applied to regulatory takings challenges by
private property owners. He explained:
[t]he principal “otherwise” that we have in mind is litigation
absolving the State (or private parties) of liability for the
destruction of “real and personal property, in cases of actual
necessity, to prevent the spreading of a fire” or to forestall other
grave threats to the lives and property of others.182
Relying upon two nineteenth-century takings cases, Bowditch v. Boston
and United States v. Pacific R. Co., Scalia highlighted that the
government is absolved from providing just compensation to
homeowners due to emergency factors outside the government’s
control. In Bowditch, the Supreme Court held that the City of Boston
was not liable for a taking when it demolished a building in an effort to
thwart a major fire.183 In United States v. Pacific R. Co., the Court held

177 See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 440 (1934) (“[A]
temporary and conditional restraint, where vital public interests would otherwise suffer
. . . .”).
178 Id. at 439.
179 Herring et al., supra note 37, at s1.
180 See Robin Kundis Craig, Drought and Public Necessity: Can a Common-Law “Stick”
Increase Flexibility in Western Water Law?, 6 TEX. A&M L. REV. 77, 79-81 (2018).
181 United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 154 (1952).
182 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Couns., 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 n.16 (quoting Bowditch v. City
of Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 18 (1879)) (citing United States v. Pac. R.R. Co., 120 U.S. 227,
238 (1887)).
183 Bowditch v. City of Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 17-18 (1879).
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that the government was not liable for the destruction of private
property caused by military operations in the Civil War.184
To be sure, in Lucas, the Court is relying upon Reconstruction-era
cases, far removed from our current understanding of climate science,
climate change, and its follow-on impacts. Yet this common law
emergency doctrine continues to lurk in the background, providing
supplemental authorities for governmental action wholly independent
of the NEA. This common law emergency authority will likely grow in
importance as cities and localities wrestle with climate change’s
massively destabilizing effects while protecting the most vulnerable
communities from storm surge, wildfires, and other extreme weather.
Regardless of emergency definitions proposed by scientists, scholars,
statutes, or courts, Congress has chosen not to define the term within
the NEA, effectively delegating this decision to the President. The two
emergency definitions that appear most relevant to climate change —
the Stafford Act and emergency as defined by climate scientists —
emphasize risk, urgency, and the need to take action to avoid a bad
outcome.
As discussed below, the NEA does provide several substantive,
supplemental authorities to address climate domestically and
internationally — I turn to these authorities below.
III. CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE NATIONAL EMERGENCIES ACT
In what follows, I describe and analyze how the NEA and its
implementing statutes could be used to address the climate crisis. This
Article largely focuses on ex ante authorities that can be employed
immediately. A fuller discussion of ex post Stafford Act emergency
authorities is beyond this Article’s scope, although the Stafford Act will
assuredly take on increased importance as we respond to climate-driven
natural disasters. In addition, while the NEA is a federal emergency
statute, cities, states, and localities possess broad emergency police
powers that could also be utilized to address the climate crisis. To date,
thirty different nations have declared some version of a climate
emergency and hundreds of climate emergencies have already been
declared at the state and local level, independent of any federal action.185
184

United States v. Pac. R.R. Co., 120 U.S. 227, 238-39 (1887).
See, e.g., Grandoni, supra note 34 (noting that over thirty counties have declared
climate emergencies). As Professor Scheppele has noted, such “small emergencies” have
become increasingly common and normalized. According to Professor Scheppele, the
emergency mode is a viable and legal alternative within the law. See generally Scheppele,
supra note 139, at 855 (stating that “[t]he President’s use of emergency powers often
185
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Relying upon traditional authorities alone will fail to close the
emissions gap.186 We are woefully off target to close the difference
between the world’s current path and measures needed to manage
climate change.187 To avoid climate change’s catastrophic, irreversible
impacts and meet the Paris Accord’s goals, nations must roughly triple
their current emissions-cutting pledges.188 Doing so will require making
fundamental changes to our way of life. The specific climate emergency
authorities are outlined below in the sequential order of their potential
use, taking into account the underlying legitimacy of their use.
A. First, Declare Climate Change a National Emergency
Prior to unlocking any of the NEA’s follow-on authorities, the
President must first determine that climate change (or one of its
impacts) is a national emergency. This could take many forms. The
President could choose to make a generalized climate change
emergency declaration, or he could specify a specific climate impact that
is the basis for the national emergency (e.g., wildfires, droughts, sea
level rise, or other extreme weather). Making an initial emergency
declaration does not immediately operationalize any emergency
powers, but it does serve a signaling function, drawing upon the
powerful rhetorical value of an emergency declaration. A climate
emergency declaration would align with the consensus climate science,
which has already acknowledged a state of planetary emergency and the
need for urgent action.189
Some members of Congress have already begun to call for such a
climate emergency declaration. Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT) and
others recently proposed a Senate Resolution that calls on the legislative
branch to declare climate change a national emergency under the NEA.
happens in a parallel legal universe, not one that steps outside the law to contain a
crisis.”).
186 See UNITED 2020, supra note 26, at 18 (stating that “postponing transformational
action is not an option” when it comes to closing the emissions gap). See generally
Steffen et al., supra note 10 (concluding that incremental linear changes are not enough
to stabilize the Earth’s system).
187 See UNITED 2020, supra note 26, at 20 (concluding that there is an “enormous
challenge facing the global community in achieving the temperature goals of the Paris
Agreement”); Steffen et al., supra note 10, at 8257 (stating that international initiatives
are not enough to meet the Paris agreement target).
188 Brady Dennis, Chris Mooney & Sarah Kaplan, The World’s Rich Need to Cut Their
Carbon Footprint by A Factor of 30 to Slow Climate Change, U.N. Warns, WASH. POST (Dec.
9, 2020, 5:00 AM EST), https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/
2020/12/09/carbon-footprints-climate-change-rich-one-percent/ [perma.cc/U2LJ-F3BA].
189 See supra Part I.
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It states that there must be “massive-scale mobilization to halt, reverse,
and address [climate change’s] consequences and causes.”190 The Senate
Resolution makes clear that “nothing in this concurrent resolution
constitutes a declaration of a national emergency for purposes of any
Act of Congress.”191 By drawing on the power of the “emergency”
language to highlight the severity of the climate threat, the resolution
seeks to marshal national attention for future action. Declaring a climate
emergency may shift the focus and inertia back to Congress to pass
climate legislation. It also provides explicit notice to Congress that
follow-on emergency action may follow, particularly if Congress refuses
to act on climate. Doing so may well act as a prod for congressional
action with the potential to break the congressional logjam on climate
— a successful approach in other contexts.192
Of course, political backlash to a climate emergency declaration could
follow — it is impossible to say. Under the NEA, emergencies are in
place for just one year and are not automatically renewed. The President
must take follow-on action to provide notice of the emergency
declaration in the Federal Register. In the event of political backlash,
the President could discretely let the climate emergency run its course
and choose not the renew it after one year. This would simply return to
the status quo. Once a climate emergency is declared, I’ve identified five
emergency implementing authorities that are good candidates to
address the climate crisis head-on.
B. The Defense Production Act: Supplemental Emergency Authorities
As a first step after declaring a national emergency, the President
could turn to the powerful Defense Production Act (“DPA”) and its
delegated powers to jumpstart climate-related research and
development.193 As discussed supra Part II, activating DPA authorities
190 S. Con. Res. 22, 116th Cong. (2019) (“Whereas the United States Department of
State, Department of Defense, and intelligence community have identified climate
change as a threat to national security, and the Department of Homeland Security views
climate change as a top homeland security risk.”).
191 Id. Sen. Schumer (D-NY) has also invited President Biden to declare a climate
emergency, stating “[I]f there ever was an emergency, climate is one.” Davenport &
Friedman, supra note 9.
192 See Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government in
an Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350, 354 (2011). As Professor Sarah Light has
argued in the national security context, linking the shared values between
environmental and national security law can raise awareness and further validate
climate science. See Sarah E. Light, Valuing National Security: Climate Change, the
Military, and Society, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1772, 1778 (2014).
193 See 50 U.S.C. §§ 4532-4533 (2018).

628

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 55:591

does not necessarily require an emergency declaration, but doing so can
provide additional funding authorities. The DPA can first be used
independent of emergency authorities, providing a legal “one-two
punch.” To do so, the President must link DPA authorities with a
national defense purpose.194 Declaring a climate emergency provides
additional DPA loan limits in excess of $50 million dollars to the private
sector for “critical technology items, or essential materials needed for
national defense purposes.”195 This option could be used for both
renewable energy start-ups and the development of capital-intensive
and high-risk/high-reward ventures like carbon capture and
sequestration (“CCS”) technology. Tapping into these authorities can
help with DoD’s own climate mitigation efforts, with follow-on
utilization outside the military. Under the Defense Advanced Research
Project Agency (“DARPA”), the U.S. military has a rich tradition of
developing technologies — such as the Internet and GPS — that benefit
both the military and the private sector.
CCS requires enormous research and development costs, which have
served as a barrier to private investment. But CCS holds great promise
in our collective efforts to reverse GHG emissions. By one estimate, CCS
has the potential to capture up to ninety percent of carbon dioxide
produced by a typical coal-fired power plant.196 Because CCS requires
high capital expenditures, property acquisition, and significant pipeline
infrastructure to be fully operationalized, it is a technology ripe for
government incentives and funding.197 One can envision the DPA being
employed in a manner that first activates its non-emergency authorities
to jump-start private-sector renewable energy investment across a broad
section of clean energy technologies (wind, solar, geothermal). If a
climate emergency is declared, the President can trigger additional
funding authorities to incentivize carbon capture technology and more
capital-intensive renewable energy technologies.

194 The President can point to the recent Interim National Security Strategy and the
increasingly understood link between climate change and national defense. See infra
Part IV.A.
195 50 U.S.C. §§ 4531(a)(1), (d)(1)(A); see also Sarah E. Light, The MilitaryEnvironmental Complex, 55 B.C. L. REV. 879, 885-86 (2014) (linking national security
with climate change); Nevitt, supra note 37, at 357.
196 PETER FOLGER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41325, CARBON CAPTURE: A TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT 3 (2013).
197 See Jacobs & Craig, supra note 91, at 719.
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C. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”):
Protecting the Amazon and Prohibiting the Import of Illegally Forested
Products
The IEEPA is the most used emergency arrow within the presidential
emergency quiver: thirty-one of thirty-seven national emergencies rely
upon authorities found in the IEEPA.198 The IEEPA provides another
possible pathway to address climate change that also draws upon the
President’s broad constitutional authorities in foreign affairs and
international relations.199 The IEEPA was passed in 1977, just one year
after the NEA’s passage. It states in pertinent part:
Any authority granted to the President by section 1702 may be
exercised to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat,
which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the
United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or
economy of the United States, if the President declares a national
emergency with respect to such threat.200
Further, the IEEPA’s widespread usage has been upheld by the courts
and Congress has largely acquiesced in its widespread use.201
Consider the first time that the IEEPA was used, reflecting both the
power and the durability of this statute. Two years after the IEEPA’s
passage, the American Embassy in Iran was seized, and U.S. diplomatic
personnel were captured and held hostage. President Carter declared a
national emergency and blocked the removal or transfer of Iranian
government property within the jurisdiction of the United States.202 The
Supreme Court held that the President acted lawfully when he declared
a national emergency and used the IEEPA to seize Iranian assets.203
Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist found that the IEEPA’s
authorities are “sweeping and unqualified” and President Carter was
authorized to order the transfer of Iranian assets as authorized by the

198 See Halchin, supra note 3, at 12-14; EMILY E. ROBERTS, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
LSB10252, DECLARATIONS UNDER THE NATIONAL EMERGENCIES ACT, PART 1: DECLARATIONS
CURRENTLY IN EFFECT 2-11 (2019); EMILY E. ROBERTS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10253,
DECLARATIONS UNDER THE NATIONAL EMERGENCIES ACT, PART 2: DECLARATIONS NO
LONGER IN EFFECT 2-9 (2019).
199 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
200 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (2018) (emphasis added).
201 See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 673-74, 688 (1981).
202 See id. at 662-63 (President Carter’s use of the IEEPA to block the removal or
transfer of all property and interests of the government of Iran).
203 Id. at 686.
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IEEPA.204 Remarkably, over forty years and seven presidents later, this
Carter-era emergency remains in effect. It has been renewed annually
by every president, regardless of political party. In practice, the IEEPA
serves as the “Swiss-Army knife” of emergency powers, with broad
flexibility to address both traditional and non-traditional threats.205
The IEEPA was also used throughout the 1980s to impose sanctions
against numerous nations (e.g., South Africa, Libya, Iran, Nicaragua)
and there are currently thirty-one active emergencies that sanction or
block property of certain person in a remarkably diverse group of
countries (e.g., Zimbabwe, Yemen, Ukraine) to address a diverse set of
issues.206 In response to the brutal South Africa apartheid regime, for
example, President Reagan declared an emergency and used the IEEPA
to sanction the white-led South African government.207 Critics
characterized this as merely “perceiving a sudden danger” that preempted legislative action that was a dangerous use of emergency
powers.208 The U.S. was slow to respond to the apartheid crisis, but the
use of national emergency authorities signaled a fundamental shift in
U.S. policy toward South Africa. It also did not prevent future legislative
efforts: Congress passed the Comprehensively Anti-Apartheid Act the
following year and legal apartheid in South Africa crumbled under the
weight of emergency powers, legislative action, and international
pressure. While short-lived, this example showcases the power and
reach of the IEEPA to address particularly egregious domestic behavior
within foreign nations.

204 Id. at 671 (quoting Charles T. Main Int’l., Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power
Auth., 651 F.2d 800, 807 (1st Cir. 1981)).
205 The IEEPA was also used in the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks
when President George W. Bush signed Executive Order 13,224. Exec. Order No.
13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001) (prohibiting transactions with any
suspected foreign terrorists as well as any foreigner or any U.S. citizen suspected of
providing support). More recently, the IEEPA was employed to impose sanctions
following foreign interference in the 2016 U.S. election. Exec. Order No. 13,848, 83
Fed. Reg. 46,843 (Sept. 12, 2018).
206 HALCHIN, supra note 3, at 12-14. Every one of the ten emergencies declared by
President Obama that is currently in effect relies upon IEEPA authorities. Id. at 12-13.
207 Exec. Order No. 12,532, 50 Fed. Reg. 36,861 (Sept. 9, 1985). The IEEPA
emergency was ultimately revoked by President George H.W. Bush in 1991 following a
change in South African leadership and the release of President Nelson Mandela from
prison. Exec. Order No. 12,769, 56 Fed. Reg. 31,855 (July 10, 1991).
208 See, e.g., What National Emergency? Whose?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 1985),
https://www.nytimes.com/1985/09/26/opinion/what-national-emergency-whose.html
[https://perma.cc/93KG-85PQ] (discussing Regan’s declaration of a national emergency
in response to apartheid in South Africa).
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Most recently, a national emergency was declared and the IEEPA
activated to address the security of the nation’s electricity supply. In an
“Executive Order on Securing the United States Bulk-Power System,”
President Trump declared that “the unrestricted foreign supply of bulkpower system electric equipment constitutes an unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and
economy of the United States.”209 In taking action under the IEEPA, the
President prohibited the importation of bulk power system electric
equipment where there is an undue risk of sabotage that poses an undue
risk of catastrophic effects on the security or resiliency of United States
critical infrastructure. This recent example once again showcases the
IEEPA’s wide aperture to address a wide varieties of issues.210
To be sure, the IEEPA can only be used to deal with any “unusual and
extraordinary threat” that derives “in whole or substantial part outside
the United States.”211 While the IEEPA was crafted well before advances
in climate science, climate change and its corresponding impacts fall
within the purview of the IEEPA’s statutory language. Climate change
requires transformational action both inside and outside the United
States, consistent with the IEEPA text.212 And climate change is a
complex collective action problem where eighty-five percent of GHG
emissions originate outside the U.S.213 After all, the U.S. emits just
fifteen percent of worldwide emissions on an annual basis — the
remaining emissions derive in “substantial part outside the United
States” consistent with the IEEPA’s statutory requirements.214 And we
increasingly understand that climate change impacts the national
security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.215 I envision
three ways that the IEEPA could be employed if a climate emergency is
declared.
First, the IEEPA could be used to impose certain sanctions on socalled “climate rogue states” that engage in particularly harmful climate
activities that have a disproportionately harmful impact on global
209

Exec. Order No. 13,920, 85 Fed. Reg. 26,595 (May 1, 2020).
See id.
211 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (2018).
212 See UNITED 2020, supra note 26, at 2-3 (describing extreme climate change over
the past 20 years and emphasizing the need for “urgent and concerted action by all
countries across all sectors”).
213 Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/
global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-data (last visited Aug. 7, 2021) [https://perma.cc/
TL7H-BDBW] [hereinafter Global Greenhouse].
214 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a); Global Greenhouse, supra note 213.
215 See Matt McDonald, Discourses of Climate Security, 33 POL. GEOGRAPHY 42, 4445, 47-51 (2013).
210
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climate efforts.216 This is analogous to how the IEEPA has been used to
sanction nations engaging in particularly harmful or dangerous
activities. Using the IEEPA in such a manner would no doubt be
controversial. After all, climate change is a global collective action
problem, all nations contribute GHG emissions, and the U.S. is the
largest historical emitter.
But consider the harm being done to the global climate effort in Brazil,
which is currently failing to protect enormous swaths of the Amazon
rainforest (the “lungs of the planet”) under Brazilian President Jair
Bolsonaro’s stewardship. The Amazon has historically served as a
massive global carbon sink, soaking up an enormous amount of GHG
emissions.217 Brazilian President Bolsonaro has demonstrated an
unwillingness to enforce existing domestic regulations that protect the
Amazon rainforest, placing Brazilian domestic economic interests over
international climate interests.218 Yet what happens in the Amazon does
not stay in the Amazon. As climate change is a global collective action
problem, the U.S. and international community have limited tools to
shape particularly negligent climate behavior within any nation’s
borders.219 Meanwhile the president could potentially tap into IEEPA

216 I borrow the term “climate rogue states” from Professor Craig Martin. See Craig
Martin, Atmospheric Intervention? The Climate Change Crisis and the Jus ad Bellum
Regime, 45 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 331, 334 (2020).
217 The importance of sinks and reservoirs was recently highlighted in the Paris
Climate Accord, which required that “[p]arties should take action to conserve and
enhance, as appropriate, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases . . . including forests.”
Paris Accord, supra note 46, at art. 5(1). The Framework Convention on Climate
Change states that all parties shall “[p]romote sustainable management, and promote
and cooperate in the conservation and enhancement, as appropriate, of sinks and
reservoirs of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, including
biomass, forests and oceans . . . .” United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change art. 4(1)(d), May 9, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-28, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
218 See Franklin Foer, The Amazon Fires Are More Dangerous Than WMDs, ATLANTIC
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/08/amazon-fires-show-limits-sovereignty/
596779/ (last updated Aug. 25, 2019) [https://perma.cc/4UDW-EHQX] for a discussion
about destruction of the Amazon rainforest during Bolsonaro’s time as president. Some
have even speculated that there may be pressure in the near future to use military force
to save the Amazon, a proposition which is deeply troubling but nevertheless reflects
the harm to climate action that is underway in the Amazon. For a broader discussion of
international law’s coercive role in mandating climate action, see Bruce Gilley & David
Kinsella, Coercing Climate Action, 57 SURVIVAL 7, 15 (2015); Stephen M. Walt, Who Will
Save the Amazon (and How)?, FOREIGN POL’Y (Aug. 5, 2019, 5:31 PM)
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/05/who-will-invade-brazil-to-save-the-amazon/
[https://perma.cc/LNR5-SQHY].
219 International law upholds individual sovereignty over each nation’s natural
resources. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
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authorities to sanction Brazil or block the property of certain persons
engaging in illegal forestry activities in the Amazon.
Second, the IEEPA could be used to halt the trade and transport of
particularly harmful products that continue to be extracted from the
Amazon, often via illegal foresting.220 Many products from illegally
deforested lands in the Amazon can still be imported into the United
States without fear of sanction. Right now, U.S. trade policy is not
synchronized with climate policy, a point recently made by several
policy experts and diplomats.221 The IEEPA can actually help
synchronize sound climate policy with trade policy through its
enforcement mechanisms.
Third, outside the Amazon, the IEEPA could be used to limit
international trade of particularly pernicious climate products such as
nitrous oxide or single-use plastic containers. Nitrous oxide is a
particularly pernicious climate product that has an outsized impact on
GHG emissions. One ton of nitrous oxide is equivalent to nearly 300
tons of carbon dioxide, and it stays in the atmosphere for over 100
years.222
In sum, the IEEPA is a particularly promising statute to address
climate change. First, the IEEPA is a powerful grant of emergency
powers that taps into foreign relations powers, an area where the
President enjoys broader constitutional powers.223 And there is
longstanding historical practice in using the IEEPA to address a
capacious set of problems.224 The IEEPA can be used as a legal scalpel,
pinpointing specific problems that have evaded oversight. Second, the
IEEPA is a congressional delegation of foreign relations authority to the
president, an area where the president possesses comparably broader
constitutional authorities and where civil libertarian concerns are more
220 See, e.g., Foer, supra note 218 (discussing preventative measures for the
destruction of the Amazon rainforest).
221 CLIMATE P RINCIPALS, A MAZON P ROTECTION P LAN: P OLICY R ECOMMENDATIONS
FOR U.S. A CTION FOR AMAZON FORESTS 2 (2021), https://climateprincipals.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/01/Amazon-Protection-Plan-Final_Climate-Principals.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TCQ6-KSNG].
222 Overview of Greenhouse Gases: Nitrous Oxide, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/
ghgemissions/overview-greenhouse-gases#nitrous-oxide [https://perma.cc/GCM5-AT5S].
223 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
224 See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 670-71 (1981); Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[A]
systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the
Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn
to uphold the Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power part of the
structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive Power’ vested in
the President by § 1 of Art. II.”).
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muted.225 Critics of emergency power correctly focus on the potential
for emergency legal authorities to harm domestic civil liberties, but the
IEEPA largely sidesteps this concern. In taking action outside U.S.
borders, the President will be afforded even greater deference by judicial
challenges. In Youngstown, Justice Jackson would “indulge the widest
latitude of interpretation” when the “instruments of national force . . .
[are] turned against the outside world.”226 But when this power is
“turned inward . . . it should have no such indulgence.”227 There is also
some support that this unilateral action is generally consistent with
international principles that prohibit states from knowingly allowing
their territory to cause harm to other states.228
Of course, declaring a climate emergency and employing the IEEPA
to sanction other nations would expose the United States to
international criticism. The U.S. is, after all, the world’s largest historical
GHG emitter and has been an unreliable partner at times in
international climate negotiations. The IEEPA could potentially
sidestep core legitimacy concerns if it were used with precision,
focusing on developed nations that have energy choices but still engage
in particularly harmful climate activities.
D. Emergency Military Construction Authorities: Climate Infrastructure
Investment
In the recent national emergency governing the construction of a
border wall, the President activated the emergency provisions within
the Military Construction Codification Act. This emergency authority
states:
In the event of a declaration of war or the declaration by the
President of a national emergency in accordance with the
National Emergencies Act that requires use of the armed forces,
the Secretary of Defense, without regard to any provision of law,
may undertake military construction projects, not otherwise
authorized by law that are necessary to support such use of the
armed forces.229

225

See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. at 319-20.
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 645 (Jackson, J., concurring).
227 Id.; see also Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in
Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1311 (1988).
228 See Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1938-77 (1941).
229 10 U.S.C. § 2808(a) (2018).
226
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The use of this statute to build a border wall stretches this statute
beyond its plain meaning — a point made recently by the Ninth
Circuit.230 Nevertheless, emergency military construction authorities
are of increased relevance for climate change, and there is a comparably
stronger — but by no means certain — legal basis to use this authority
to invest in climate resilient infrastructure at military installations.231
To activate section 2808 authorities, the emergency must “require[]
use of the armed forces,” and the military construction project must be
necessary to “support such use of the armed forces.”232 Does a climate
emergency and tapping into the military construction statute authority
“require use of the armed forces?” Possibly.233 The military, often via
the state-based National Guard or Coast Guard, are increasingly called
upon and required to respond to an ever-expanding menu of extreme
weather events. Humanitarian assistance and disaster response is now a
core military mission.234 The uptick in extreme weather events increases
the likelihood that the armed forces will be used for a wide variety of
natural disaster-related missions such as wildfire evacuation, postdisaster recovery, and defense support to local and civil authorities.
Consider the tragedy that now unfolds every wildfire season in
California and parts of the United States. The military assists local first
responders in responding to the extended wildfire seasons, providing
230

Sierra Club v. Trump, 977 F.3d. 853, 901-07 (9th Cir. 2020).
Proclamation No. 10142, 86 Fed. Reg. 7225 (Jan. 20, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/20/proclamationtermination-of-emergency-with-respect-to-southern-border-of-united-states-andredirection-of-funds-diverted-to-border-wall-construction/ [https://perma.cc/MZ2B-B6E2]
(announcing there will no longer be shifting of funds to the border wall).
232 10 U.S.C. § 2808(a).
233 The Ninth Circuit held that the use of the 2808 authority to construct a border
wall failed the “require use of armed forces” prong. “[The] border wall construction
might make DoD’s support more efficient and effective does not rise to the level of
‘required’ or ‘needed.’” Sierra Club, 977 F.3d. at 881. The dissenting opinion took a
different view: “If (as I have explained) the requirement that the emergency must be
one ‘that requires use of the armed forces’ pertains to the ‘declaration’ itself, then that
phrase merely describes the content of the required ‘declaration’ and does not supply a
freestanding requirement to be examined separately from that declaration. As a result,
the statute does not require a separate inquiry into whether the findings made by the
President in the required declaration are substantively valid; it merely requires a
‘declaration’ meeting the statutory requirements . . . as a result, the statute does not
require a separate inquiry into whether the findings made by the President in the
required declaration are substantively valid. it merely requires a ‘declaration’ meeting
the statutory requisites.” Id. at 902 (Collins, J., dissenting).
234 See 10 U.S.C. § 401(a)(1) (“[T]he Secretary of a military department may carry
out humanitarian and civic assistance activities in conjunction with authorized military
operations of the armed forces . . . .”).
231
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firefighting equipment and aiding with the evacuation of people fleeing
their homes.235
In addition, military construction projects such as investment in
climate-resilient infrastructure on or adjacent to nearby military
installations likely meet the second prong: the construction project
must “support such use of armed forces.” Military installations rely
upon energy sources from energy suppliers outside the installation.
Military installations and their energy providers are increasingly
threatened by rapidly spreading wildfires and extreme weather events.
Servicemembers evacuated their families during the 2020 California
wildfire season.236 Efforts to shore up the energy supply and grid
adjacent to military installations would reasonably support the armed
forces, consistent with statutory requirements. If a climate emergency
is declared, I envision two possible scenarios where this 2808 authority
could be used.
First, the military construction authority could invest in critical,
climate resilient infrastructure at military installations. Advances in
climate attribution science make clear that climate change exacerbates
both the frequency and intensity of extreme weather.237 This causes a
heightened risk to critical national security infrastructure at military
installations.238 Both Hurricanes Michael and Florence, for example,
inflicted billions of dollars of damage to national security infrastructure
at Tyndall Air Force Base and Camp Lejeune following the 2018
hurricane season. The uptick in extreme weather also undermines
national security readiness as these bases include critical military assets.
Despite congressional action to mandate that the military report on
climate change’s threat to military installations, congressional
appropriations have failed to keep pace with the underlying threat. Why
not take ex ante measures under the NEA to reduce climate risk prior to
disaster striking?
Second, this authority could be used to invest in and shore up the
electric grid, particularly if the funding focuses on investing in
vulnerable grid infrastructure adjacent to key military infrastructure

235 See U.S. Dep’t of Def., Directive No. 5525.5: DoD Cooperation with Civilian Law
Enforcement Officials 1, 15 (Jan. 15, 1986).
236 This actually occurred during the wildfire season at Travis Air Force Base in
Northern California and Camp Pendleton, California during wildfire season.
237 Herring et al., supra note 37, at s1. See generally Michael Burger, Jessica Wentz
& Radley Horton, The Law and Science of Climate Attribution, 45 COLUM. J. ENV’T. L. 57,
60 (2020) (describing the increase in frequency in extreme weather events).
238 Mark P. Nevitt, The Commander in Chief’s Authority to Combat Climate Change, 37
CARDOZO L. REV. 437, 440 (2015).
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that supports the armed forces.239 Military installations do not produce
their own energy — they rely upon private energy companies outside
the installation fence-line. Energy is fed into the military installation via
a complex, antiquated, and increasingly vulnerable electric grid.240 As
wildfires increase in size and intensity, utility companies responsible for
grid security and maintenance are increasingly shutting off power to
both homeowners and military installations well in advance of extreme
weather events. As such, it almost certainly meets 10 U.S.C. § 2808’s
requirement to “support such use of the armed forces” as it protects
mission-essential energy.241
Indeed, the outdated, inefficient, and vulnerable electric grid may
well be properly conceptualized as a networked national security
infrastructure that is in need of repair and investment.242 Public
underinvestment in the electrical grid has been a causal factor in
massive wildfires in parts of California and Oregon. The 2018 Camp
Fire near Paradise, California, for example, killed eighty-five people and
destroyed large swaths of the city of Paradise. The Paradise Fire
originated from outdated grid infrastructure and it spread rapidly due
to drought and climate-exacerbated weather patterns. Investing in the
electrical grid via section 2808 authority could serve as a proactive
climate adaptation measure that helps safeguard our national security,
saves lives and property, and protects critical national security
infrastructure that “supports such use of the armed forces.”243
239 One of the goals of the Green New Deal is building or upgrading to energy
efficient, distributed, and ‘‘smart’’ power grids, and working to ensure affordable access
to electricity.
240 See generally BAKKE, supra note 65 (providing a history and overview of the U.S.
grid infrastructure).
241 10 U.S.C. § 2808(a) (2018).
242 BAKKE, supra note 65. The President could feasibly expand the section 2808
authority to strengthen the electrical grid from all threats. There is actually recent
precedent for attempting to use related emergency powers to address electric grid
reliability, albeit in a manner that harmed the environment and actually increased GHG
emissions. Eric Wolff & Darius Dixon, Rick Perry’s Coal Rescue Runs Aground at White
House, POLITICO (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/10/15/rickperry-coal-rescue-trump-850528 [https://perma.cc/CC2H-WCLB]. “Under section
202(c) of the Federal Powers Act, the Secretary of Energy can take emergency action to
maintain the operation of the electric grid.” Farber, supra note 6, at 1147-48. A broader
grid emergency could be declared that invests in grid reliance measures irrespective of
the energy source, particularly as we better understand the intersectionality of climate
change, grid reliability, and national security.
243 See Farber, supra note 6, at 1169-71. It is beyond the scope of this article to fully
address energy security matters and energy emergency authorities. For an outstanding
discussion of these emergency authorities, see THE CNA CORP., NATIONAL SECURITY AND
THE THREAT OF CLIMATE CHANGE 39 (2007) [hereinafter CAN 2007]; THE CNA CORP.,
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E. Emergency Authorities to Coordinate Domestic Transportation
The Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”), an agency
located within the Department of Homeland Security, possesses
remarkably broad authorities to coordinate domestic transportation in
the event of a national emergency.244 Specifically, during a national
emergency the Transportation Security Administrator has special
authorities to “coordinate domestic transportation, including aviation,
rail, and other surface transportation, and maritime transportation
(including port security).”245 In an emergency, the TSA Administrator
may coordinate and oversee the transportation-related responsibilities
of other departments and agencies of the Federal Government246 and
“carry out such other duties, and exercise such other powers” that the
Secretary of Homeland Security prescribes.247
This emergency transportation authority has broad appeal to address
climate change as the U.S. transportation sector is a leading contributor
of GHG emissions.248 Nevertheless, the outer scope of this authority
remains untested, in part because it is so infrequently invoked.249
Outside of the need to reduce GHG emissions from the transportation
sector, our transportation infrastructure is increasingly vulnerable to
climate change’s impacts. Sea level rise, extreme weather, and high-tide
flooding expose governmental under-investment in roads, railways, and
bridges. High temperatures negatively impact airplane efficiency and
the ability to take off, particularly on elevated runways that are
wrestling with extreme heat exacerbated by climate change.250
In an emergency the Administrator is authorized to “carry out such
duties” and “coordinate domestic transportation.”251 While we lack
clear precedent to contextualize and provide clear precedent for their
use, consider some ways in which this authority might be employed.
Once the President makes a climate emergency declaration, he
POWERING AMERICA’S DEFENSE: ENERGY AND THE RISKS TO NATIONAL SECURITY 9 (2009)
[hereinafter CNA 2009] (quoting General James Mattis) (stating that the military
should be unleashed “from the tether of fuel”); Amy L. Stein, Energy Emergencies, 115
NW. U. L. REV. 799, 799 (2020).
244 49 U.S.C. § 114(g) (2018).
245 Id. § 114(g)(1)(A).
246 Id. § 114(g)(1)(B). This authority does not include oversight over the Department
of Defense. Id.
247 Id. § 114(g)(1)(D).
248 NCA4, supra note 13, at 481.
249 See id.
250 Id. at 489.
251 49 U.S.C. §§ 114(g)(1)(A)-(D).
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specifically empowers the Secretary of Homeland Security and TSA
Administrator to use this authority to both reduce transportation sector
GHG emissions and safeguard critical transportation infrastructure.252
This could prioritize less carbon-intensive freight shipping, such as rail
or electric trucks. More broadly, this coordination authority could also
potentially be used to help the environmental planning process to
inform better siting conditions for airports, taking into account climate
change and extreme heat events. Less carbon intensive transportation
options such as commercial electric vehicle (“EV”) production and
charging stations could be prioritized and fast-tracked via federal
permitting that takes into account climate-friendly practices. Using this
authority to fund climate adaptation measures at airports, roads, and
train stations will likely be more challenging as the “coordination”
authority is silent on funding authorities.
F.

Suspension of Fossil Fuel Extraction on Federal Lands

Finally, during a state of war or national emergency, the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”) authorizes the President to
suspend existing federal leases on the outer continental shelf.253 As
discussed earlier, the President has authorities independent of a climate
emergency declaration to withdraw unleased outer continental shelf
lands from future fossil fuel extraction.254 President Biden recently
activated this authority to suspend future oil and gas extraction on
federally owned lands.255 And the President has already limited fossil
252 The National Highway plan was developed and designed for national security
reasons under President Eisenhower. Note that this authority is held by the
Transportation Security Administrator, an agency under the Department of Homeland
Security. This would inevitably require close coordination with the Department of
Transportation. The new Secretary of Transportation, Pete Buttigieg has repeatedly
highlighted the importance of the transportation sector taking into account climate
change. See, e.g., Alexander Burns, Pete Buttigieg’s Campaign Kickoff: Full Speech,
Annotated, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/15/us/
politics/pete-buttigieg-speech.html [https://perma.cc/4MEJ-H9PK] (stating that climate
change “might be the great security issue of our time”).
253 43 U.S.C. § 1341(c) (2018).
254 The President may “from time to time, withdraw from disposition any of the
unleased lands of the outer Continental Shelf.” Id. § 1341(a). Relatedly, the President
has broad authorities to establish “national defense areas” that restrict operations (such
as drilling) in designated areas. Id. § 1341(d).
255 Biden Climate Order, supra note 24, at 7624-25. (“To the extent consistent with
applicable law, the Secretary of the Interior shall pause new oil and natural gas leases
on public lands or in offshore waters pending completion of a comprehensive review
and reconsideration of Federal oil and gas permitting and leasing practices in light of
the Secretary of the Interior’s broad stewardship responsibilities over the public lands
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fuel extraction on certain federal lands, to include the Alaska National
Wildlife Refuge (“ANWR”).
In addition to these traditional authorities, all current federal leases
authorizing oil and fossil fuel extraction on outer continental shelf lands
contain a national security clause that suspends operations upon a
recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.256 Similar to the
transportation emergency, this suspension authority is broad, and its
outer limits are untested. If broadly implemented, it could have an
immediate, substantive impact on climate mitigation efforts. The United
States has one of the world’s largest exclusive economic zones and outer
continental shelves, which contains an enormous amount of untapped
oil and gas resources. But the statute makes clear that just compensation
must be provided to the lessee if operations are suspended.257 The
requirement to reimburse existing leaseholders will make it difficult to
scale this authority rapidly in the event that a climate emergency is
declared.258 Nevertheless, this authority could feasibly be used to
immediately suspend federal leaseholders that engage in particularly
harmful behavior. Recently studies have shown the stunning impact of
“routine” venting, flaring, and leaking during oil and natural gas
production — an enormous source of GHG emissions.259 The
Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security have a vested interest in
preventing environmental disasters prior to their occurrence. The U.S.
Coast Guard, for example, plays a critical role in environmental
enforcement and led the environmental cleanup in the Deepwater
Horizon offshore oil leak in 2009.
The Table of emergency statutes below highlights the key climate
emergency authorities, in the recommended order of their potential
activation.
and in offshore waters, including potential climate and other impacts associated with
oil and gas activities on public lands or in offshore waters.”).
256 43 U.S.C. § 1341(c).
257 Id. The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause states that “nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. There
remains an open question whether the suspension of fossil fuel leases requires just
compensation if, indeed, this governmental action falls under an emergency exception
to the Takings Clause. See discussion supra Part II.C.3.
258 See 43 U.S.C. § 1341(c). The outer continental shelf is the portion of the
continental shelf that extends beyond the Exclusive Economic Zone.
259 The Department of Interior has already highlighted this concern on federal leases.
See Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation, 81
Fed. Reg. 83,008, 83,009 (Nov. 18, 2016) (stating that “the vented or leaked gas
contributes to climate change, because the primary constituent of natural gas is
methane, an especially powerful greenhouse gas (GHG), with climate impacts roughly
25 times that of carbon dioxide”).
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Table B: Relevant Climate Emergency Authorities
Statute
National Emergencies
Act260
Climate Emergency
Declaration
Defense Production
Act Emergency
International
Emergency Economic
Powers Act262

Military Construction
Authority264

260

Climate Emergency Utilization
Serves as the statutory “key” to unlock the
various statutory provisions below.
Signals the severity of the climate crisis.
Communicates possible forthcoming
emergency measures to Congress.
Increases loan authority in excess of $50
million for green energy investment and
carbon capture technology.261
(1) Prohibits import or export of
pernicious climate products (e.g. nitrous
oxide) of illegally forested products;263
(2) sanctions “climate rogue states” that
engage in destructive climate behavior
(e.g. Brazilian destruction of Amazon
rainforest); (3) blocks property of persons
engaging in illegal forestation.
(1) Investment in climate resilient
infrastructure at military
Installations; (2) invest in renewable
energy construction projects or adjacent
grid reinvestment; (3) invest in energy
security initiatives.265

50 U.S.C. § 1621(a) (2018).
Id. § 4531(d).
262 Id. § 1701 (“Any authority granted to the President by section 1702 of this title
may be exercised to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has it source
in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign
policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency
with respect to such threat.”).
263 A “climate rogue state” could include Brazil via the massive Amazon deforestation
or Saudi Arabia, which owns Aramco (responsible for an estimated 4.38% of worldwide
GHG emissions). Matthew Taylor & Jonathan Watts, Revealed: The 20 Firms Behind a
Third of all Carbon Emissions, GUARDIAN (Oct. 9, 2019, 7:00 AM EDT),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/oct/09/revealed-20-firms-third-carbonemissions [https://perma.cc/4TDQ-CCV8].
264 10 U.S.C. § 2808 (2018).
265 See supra Part III.D.
261
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The Transportation Security
Administrator has authority to
“coordinate domestic transportation” to
include aviation, rail, surface, and
maritime transportation during a national
emergency.267 Incentivize carbon-friendly
travel via federal policies and permitting
procedures.
Suspends fossil fuel extraction on “any
lease” on federal lands during a national
emergency.269

IV. CLIMATE-EMERGENCY OPPORTUNITIES & CHALLENGES
Climate change is truly a unique, even “super wicked” problem.270
This is largely due to climate’s temporal dimension: the longer we wait
to act, the greater the climate impacts and the potential for irreversible,
catastrophic, harm. Further, climate change accelerates existing threats
and destabilizes environmental conditions such as food insecurity and
droughts. In what follows, I address the close linkage between climate
change and national security, a recognition that bolsters taking
emergency action. As I attempt to reconcile the costs for inaction within
an existing emergency powers framework, I propose borrowing
principles from both climate science and international environmental
law. Both are clear-eyed about the mounting costs of inaction and the
harm to future generations. Such costs grow non-linearly over time. I
next address the criticisms of a climate emergency declaration,
concluding with a roadmap for possible climate-emergency action.
A. Climate Change, National Security, and Emergency Powers
While “national security” and “emergency” are not synonymous, they
share close, connective tissue. The president possesses broad national
security authorities and has an affirmative duty to protect the American
people.271 A diverse group of military, national security, and intelligence

266

49 U.S.C. § 114(g) (2018).
Id.
268 43 U.S.C. § 1341 (2018) (titled “Reservation of lands and rights” on the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands).
269 Id. § 1341(c).
270 Lazarus, supra note 19, at 1159.
271 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
267
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community professionals are increasingly sounding the alarm on
climate change’s national security impacts.272 Climate change is not just
an environmental issue, it is also a complex national security issue,
acting as both a “threat accelerant” and “catalyst for conflict.”273
We have seen an increasing number of intelligence and national
security professionals sound the alarm on the need for climate action.
The coronavirus crisis has highlighted the need to address nontraditional security threats as the United States has lost more lives in the
coronavirus pandemic than were lost in World War II.274 And Congress
has shown an increasing interest in climate-security matters,
reaffirming the view that climate change is properly conceptualized as
a bona fide emergency where immediate action is needed. Consider the
following examples of the increasingly close connection between
national security and climate change.
First, Congress has affirmatively recognized climate change as a
national security threat in recent bipartisan funding bills, stating:
[C]limate change is a direct threat to the national security of the
United States and is impacting the stability in areas of the world
both where the United States Armed Forces are operating today,
and where strategic implications for future . . . 275
Second, for decades both the national security community and
intelligence agencies have consistently stated in their reports that
climate change is a significant threat that requires our attention.
Military combatant commands are already required to incorporate
drivers of instability — such as climate change — into their planning
for future conflicts. The Director of National Intelligence recently
stated:
[G]lobal environmental and ecological degradation, as well as
climate change, are likely to fuel competition for resources,

272 Nevitt, Is Climate Change A Threat, supra note 17, at 528-34; see THE CNA CORP.,
CNA 2009, supra note 243, at 2.
273 See CNA 2007, supra note 243.
274 Will Stone & Carrie Feibel, The U.S. ‘Battles’ Coronavirus, But Is It Fair to Compare
Pandemic to a War?, NPR (Feb. 3, 2021, 5:00 AM ET), https://www.npr.org/sections/
health-shots/2021/02/03/962811921/the-u-s-battles-coronavirus-but-is-it-fair-to-comparepandemic-to-a-war [https://perma.cc/W43L-HLN8].
275 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91,
§ 335, 131 Stat. 1283 (2017). Congress’s view is in sharp contrast to its approach to the
border emergency where Congress affirmative objected to the expenditure of the money
to build a U.S.-Mexico border wall. See H.R.J. Res. 46, 116th Cong. (2019); 165 Cong.
Rec. H2799, H2814-15 (2019).
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economic distress, and social discontent through 2019 and
beyond. Climate hazards such as extreme weather, higher
temperatures, droughts, floods, wildfires, storms, sea level rise,
soil degradation, and acidifying oceans are intensifying,
threatening infrastructure, health, and water and food
security.276
This has been accompanied by similar pronouncements by the U.S.
government’s leading scientists, who sounded the alarm bells on climate
change’s impacts in the 2018 Fourth National Climate Assessment:
Climate change, variability, and extreme events, in conjunction
with other factors, can exacerbate conflict, which has
implications for U.S. national security. Climate impacts already
affect U.S. military infrastructure, and the U.S. military is
incorporating climate risks in its planning.277
Third, outside the national security realm, the EPA has already made
a formal finding that GHGs endanger human life and welfare both
within the United States and globally.278
Failure to use applicable emergency powers for political reasons can
also be an abuse of power, particularly when viewed through the lens
of the president’s protective power.279 Climate change is not just a
human security and national security issue, it also raises fundamental
questions of fairness, equity, and environmental justice.280 The poorest
communities face the brunt of climate change’s impacts, but they lack
the resources to respond and adapt to climate’s impacts. Congress,
scientists, scholars, national security professionals have increasingly
sounded the alarm on climate change’s security implications, with
leading climate scientists calling for transformational action to avoid
climate change’s worst effects.281 Climate change is a non-traditional
threat more akin to our pandemic emergency response, which has
already cost 500,000 American lives (and counting). Our slow response
to the coronavirus crisis highlights that our collective failure to activate
276

Coates, supra note 89, at 23.
NCA4, supra note 13, at 605.
278 Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under the
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/
endangerment-and-cause-or-contribute-findings-greenhouse-gases-under-section-202aclean (last visited Aug. 28, 2021) [https://perma.cc/XR26-STDT].
279 See Monaghan, supra note 30, at 32-38.
280 See Maryam Jamshidi, The Climate Change Crisis Is a Human Security, Not a
National Security Issue, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 36, 41-42 (2019).
281 See UNITED 2020, supra note 26, at 2-4.
277

2021]

Is Climate Change a National Emergency?

645

emergency authorities can also be costly. There are sound ethical
arguments that suggest that the President has a responsibility to use all
legal tools at his disposal.
B. Climate Emergency Criticisms
Climate emergency skeptics must reckon with the growing, nonlinear costs for continual climate inaction, particularly the cost imposed
on the most vulnerable populations. Climate change has three unique
characteristics that penalize inaction and passivity: the rising severity of
climate impacts, the irreversibility of climate impacts, and the urgency
with which we must approach climate change to avert catastrophic
harm.282 Complicating matters, GHG emissions emitted today stay in
the atmosphere for decades, wreaking havoc on our planet while
limiting adaptation options for future generations.
Skeptics of using emergency powers to address climate change make
four primary arguments: (1) climate change does not meet the
traditional definition of emergency; (2) a climate emergency presents a
risk to democratic governance; (3) emergency powers will not suffice to
combat climate change; and (4) a climate emergency may not survive
legal challenges.283 To be clear, these are all legitimate, fair concerns
that deserve careful consideration. But any critique of using emergency
powers must acknowledge a climate emergency’s substantive legal
authorities and the opportunity costs in delaying action. I turn to these
criticisms below.
1.

Climate Change Does Not Meet the “Emergency” Definition

Traditional conceptions of what constitutes an emergency — with the
dictionary’s emphasis on unforeseeability and the need to take
immediate action — can be difficult to apply to climate change. This
mismatch is due to the inherent risk in delaying climate action, climate
change’s multivariate effects, and not knowing with great precision
282 See generally Steffen et al., supra note 10 (discussing the “threshold, that if
crossed, could prevent stabilization of the climate”).
283 See, e.g., Soren Dayton & Kristy Parker, Why President Biden Should Not Declare
a Climate Emergency, JUST. SEC. (Feb. 10, 2021), https://www.justsecurity.org/74616/whypresident-biden-should-not-declare-a-climate-emergency/ [https://perma.cc/35F2-RDD2]
(“President Biden should not use a national emergency to take action on climate change
. . . .”); Elizabeth Goitein, Declaring Climate Change an ‘Emergency’ Won’t Help Biden
Fight It, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
outlook/2021/01/29/biden-climate-change-emergency-executive-order/ [https://perma.cc/
MU47-BKV4] (stating that climate change is not an emergency and “using emergency
powers to address it would be a misuse of those powers”).
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when or where extreme weather events might strike. The dictionary, of
course, is not the starting and ending point of what fairly constitutes a
bona fide emergency. Further, climate scientists use an entirely different
definition of emergency, emphasizing risk, urgency, and the
intervention time needed to avoid “bad outcome[s].”284 This definition
incorporates a severity component favoring immediate action — as is
surely the case with climate change.285
Nor has Congress explicitly defined emergency within the NEA,
effectively giving the president wide discretion in employing it year after
year. Since its passage, the NEA has not been used in a manner that
remains bound to unforeseeable circumstances — the thirty-seven
emergencies have often reacted to discrete events. And these
emergencies are renewed, year after year, following the initial
emergency declaration. This has occurred in full view of Congress. At
what point does an unforeseeable emergency morph into a clearly
foreseeable crisis that requires congressional action?
The unforeseeability requirement is also quite difficult to apply to
climate change and its associated impacts. Consider extreme weather.
Climate science makes clear that rising GHG emissions stay in the
earth’s atmosphere for decades, resulting in rising temperatures and an
uptick in extreme weather events. These weather events strike
erratically, with increasing ferocity and intensity. While we know that
climate change will drive extreme weather events, their precise time and
location is wholly unforeseeable.286
The cost for delay in acting equates to even greater planetary
destabilization. Climate scientists are in agreement that there are
escalating, non-linear costs in delaying climate action.287 Unlike other
public policy problems, we are entering a critical decade where it is
increasingly clear that we have “one shot” to address the climate crisis.
Mistakes — legal “mulligans” — are simply not an option.288 The
United States has been wrestling with other difficult public policy
284

Lenton et al., supra note 166, at 595 (alterations in original).
Id.
286 See generally Michael Burger, Jessica Wentz & Radley Horton, The Law and
Science of Climate Attribution, 45 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 57 (2020) (explaining how
arbitration science “seeks to isolate the effect of human influence of the climate . . . to
clarify the extent to which anthropogenic climate change causes both slow onset
changes and extreme events”); Herring et al., supra note 37 (exploring how climate
change can potentially increase the likelihood and strength of extreme weather events).
287 See UNITED 2020, supra note 26, at 2.
288 See Kelly Levin, Benjamin Cashore, Steven Bernstein & Graeme Auld,
Overcoming the Tragedy of Super Wicked Problems: Constraining Our Future Selves to
Ameliorate Global Climate Change, 45 POL’Y SCI 123, 127 (2012).
285
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problems for decades, from immigration to health care. But these
problems, while difficult do not suffer from the one shot problem. We
had “several shots” to pass comprehensive health care legislation after
failing to do so in 1993. As the earth’s warming accelerates, we lack the
luxury of coming back to lawmakers for a retry.289 Indeed, failure to
make substantive progress this decade will have catastrophic, even
irreversible future effects.290 As we enter the critical climate decade, this
intervention time is closing rapidly, favoring the use of all existing legal
tools to avoid climate catastrophe. As Professors Rittel and Weber have
noted, traditional political problems are shaped by compromise, but the
physical environment “is the final arbiter of whether policy responses
are appropriate.”291
Finally, critics note that the NEA’s statutory provisions were written
without climate change in mind.292 But this critique similarly applies to
many of the other thirty-seven declared emergencies. The IEEPA, for
example, was not expressly passed with destruction of the Amazon
basin in mind, but it was also not passed to address any number of
current emergencies (such as the emergency situation in Burundi or
Zimbabwe).
2.

Climate Emergency Poses a Risk to Democratic Governance

Second, critics of a climate emergency will exclaim that climate
impacts are entirely predictable; legislators have just chosen to not
address it. Addressing climate change via emergency powers poses an
unacceptable risk to democratic governance. Yet a climate emergency
declared under the NEA does not rely upon inherent Article II
authorities to combat climate change. Critics will contend that a climate
emergency declaration is merely a continuation of further, unwarranted
accretion of presidential powers. But with one notable exception (the
border wall “emergency”), Congress has largely acquiesced to the NEA’s
widespread use. The NEA is a congressionally delegated authority to the
President. For forty-four years, the NEA has been widely used and
operationalized in full view of Congress. Congress’s approach to the
existing emergency framework can be fairly characterized by

289

Id.
See IPCC 1.5 REPORT, supra note 13, at 3-5.
291 Levin et al., supra note 288, at 127.
292 See, e.g., Goitein, supra note 283 (critiquing a national emergency declaration to
address climate change).
290
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congressional acquiescence.293 Congress has not followed through on
its obligation to consider whether to terminate the emergency and
passing legislation to reform the statute.294 While presidents have
increasingly relied upon the NEA in declaring an ever-expanding menu
of emergencies, this has taken place in full view of Congress without
congressional follow-up or reforming the national emergency statutory
framework.
Indeed, the NEA requires that Congress would meet within six
months of any national emergency declaration “to determine whether
that emergency shall be terminated.”295 But since the NEA’s passage,
Congress has failed to follow through on this requirement. And
presidents, regardless of political party, have shown a reluctance to
“undeclare” emergencies put in place by prior Presidents. This suggests
that there is a certain stickiness and durability to emergency
declarations that may even transcend partisan politics. President Biden,
for example, has renewed emergency declarations put in place by
President Trump, despite disagreeing with him on substantive policy
matters.296 And President Carter’s use of the IEEPA against Iran has
been renewed over forty times, to include four Republican presidents.
In light of this broad delegation and the NEA’s widespread use,
should our emergency statuary framework be amended or clarified?
Perhaps.297 But any critique of the NEA’s overuse applies equally to
climate change and the other thirty-seven active emergencies. Of the
thirty-seven emergencies currently in place, only two can be fairly
considered in the same category as climate change in terms of severity,
urgency, and complexity: (1) the national emergency declared in the
aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks; and (2) the COVID19 emergency. The vast majority of the other emergencies can be fairly
described as ad hoc, reactive, and in response to problems far less severe

293 But see Sierra Club v. Trump, 379 F. Supp. 3d 883, 895 (N.D. Cal. 2019)
(describing congressional attempts to halt the border wall emergency).
294 See 50 U.S.C. § 1622(a)(1) (2018).
295 Id. § 1622(b).
296 See, e.g., Joseph R. Biden Jr., Notice on the Continuation of the National Emergency
with Respect to Hong Kong, WHITE HOUSE (July 7, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/07/07/notice-on-the-continuation-of-thenational-emergency-with-respect-to-hong-kong/
[https://perma.cc/K3XF-P474]
(announcing Biden’s decision to extend an executive order made by Donald J. Trump).
297 Sen. Mike Lee (R-UT) recently introduced the “Article One Act” that seeks to
reform the NEA by placing a sixty day sunset provision if Congress does not specifically
approve the emergency. See Dayton & Parker, supra note 283.
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than climate change.298 These emergencies simply pale in comparison
to climate change’s severity, risk, and time left to avoid catastrophic,
irreversible impacts.
Further, climate science makes clear that we will need to take a
diverse, multifaceted approach to tackle the climate crisis. Climate
governance has been hampered by a sclerotic governance structure
without a central authority to harness climate efforts and initiatives,
hindering climate progress.299 Climate legislation that institutes a
domestic carbon tax, for example, would do wonders for domestic
climate mitigation efforts, but would fall short in systematically
addressing broader climate adaptation efforts. A climate emergency
could actually focus and centralize climate efforts as the president can
ratchet emergency powers as needed in response to the threat, scientific
advances, and climate progress.
As Professor Lazarus and others have articulated, climate change is a
stunningly difficult, “super-wicked” problem to solve via traditional
legislative efforts.300 Any legislative or administrative rulemaking effort
that tackles climate change will be under constant political pressure to
be unraveled as the benefits to any legislation may not be seen for
decades, but the costs are imposed today.301
Lawmakers (and powerful, outside interests) will always be
calculating the short-term costs and long-term benefits behind any
climate action. So long-term success via any climate legislative effort
requires innovative, built-in institutional design features. Lawmakers
must take on the role of Ulysses in the Odyssey, putting safeguards in
place to avoid the sirens’ song of future repeal. Addressing climate
change will require lawmakers to think beyond normal time horizons
in the pursuit of durable legislative efforts that last for generations. This
includes protecting the future at the expense of paying a political cost
today — a difficult proposition in the best of circumstances.302 Any
climate legislation imposes short-term costs for the realization of
benefits that will arrive decades and even centuries later.303

298 See, e.g., HALCHIN, supra note 3, at 12-14 tbl.2 (describing emergencies associated
with the International Criminal Court and blocking property of certain persons who
threaten the international situation in the Western Balkans).
299 See Levin et al., supra note 288, at 125-27.
300 See Lazarus, supra note 19, at 1159-61.
301 See Levin et al., supra note 288, at 123 (highlighting four key features of climate
change).
302 See Lazarus, supra note 19, at 1159-60.
303 Id. at 1157.
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Congressional action continues to be hindered by political economy
problems exacerbated by outside interest groups that re-frame and
distort the consensus science. Ideally, Congress would pass climate
legislation today, but the last major environmental law was passed in
1990 when there was far greater bi-partisan support for congressional
environmental action. Any dismissal of a climate emergency must be
realistic about the likelihood of comprehensive, climate legislation
passing.
In sum, Congress must continue to work diligently to pass climate
legislation and incentivize technological climate innovation. EPA and
other agencies can make substantive climate progress via the
rulemaking process. That is already occurring. Yet it is increasingly
clear that reliance upon traditional legal authorities alone will not be
enough to avoid climate change’s irreversible and catastrophic effects.304
Climate scientists make increasingly clear that taking transformational
action today is not just a quaint suggestion. It is a necessary predicate
for the world to have any chance of keeping global temperatures at a
level that avoids cataclysmic harm.305
3.

A Climate Emergency Does Not Solve the Climate Crisis

Critics of a climate emergency also point out that climate emergency
authorities are simply inadequate to address the climate crisis.306 Similar
arguments were made in Massachusetts v. EPA, when EPA attempted to
justify its failure to regulate GHG emissions as an air pollutant under
the Clean Air Act.307 The Bush-era EPA argued that taking a piecemeal
approach would conflict with a hypothetically comprehensive approach
by the President.308 This would further hamper the President’s ability to
persuade key developing countries to reduce their GHG emissions.309
Ruling for the majority, Justice Stevens rejected this argument, noting
that agencies, like legislation, do not generally resolve massive problems
in on fell regulatory swoop.310 A climate emergency is by no means a

304

See discussion supra Part I.A.
GLOBAL CLIMATE 2020, supra note 63, at 5-7 (providing evidence of a rising global
temperature).
306 See, e.g., Dayton & Parker, supra note 283 (highlighting reasons why “President
Biden should not use a national emergency to take action on climate change”).
307 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 513 (2007).
308 Id.
309 Id.
310 Id. at 524 (“[A] reduction in domestic emissions would slow the pace of global
emissions increases, no matter what happens elsewhere.”).
305
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magical legal elixir for the climate crisis, but it does offer supplemental,
substantive legal authorities.
Climate emergency critics insist that we should instead focus on
making a large-scale transformation of the American economy away
from fossil fuels. That’s certainly true. Yet emergency authorities, such
as the DPA, can actually help accelerate that needed energy
transformation by super-charging renewable energy investment and
investing in other critical climate technologies.311
Prospective climate legislation could even work harmoniously with
emergency law, triggering emergency authorities when certain
conditions — such as the cumulative amount of GHG emissions in the
atmosphere — are met. Such an emergency tripwire provision would
prioritize traditional lawmaking efforts but acknowledge that certain
climate conditions may require emergency action. As we enter this
critical decade we will not have the luxury of time to revisit earlier
lawmaking efforts. A tripwire emergency provision could also alleviate
legitimacy concerns by providing congressional “buy-in” in advance of
a climate emergency.
4.

A Climate Emergency Will Not Survive Legal Challenges

A climate change emergency declaration would likely prompt
litigation from the fossil fuel industry and other affected stakeholders.
A climate emergency that does not activate follow-on authorities will
not create a cause of action within Article III. In the few cases addressing
the scope of the NEA, courts have acknowledged the lack of judicially
manageable standards in refusing to rule on the legality of an emergency
determination.312 Even in the recent, controversial border wall
emergency declaration that Congress voted to oppose,313 the Ninth
Circuit glossed over whether the situation at the U.S.-Mexico border
was a national emergency within the meaning of the NEA.314
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer would likely serve as the
starting point in weighing the success of any litigation challenging a
climate-emergency declaration.315 The president would likely assert that
311

See supra Part III.
See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Trump, 453 F. Supp. 3d 11, 30-34 (D.D.C.
2020) ( “[T]he court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s . . . challenges to the President’s
emergency declaration because they present non-justiciable political questions”).
313 See H.R.J. Res. 46, 116th Cong. (2019); 165 Cong. Rec. H2799, H2814 (daily ed.
Mar. 17, 2019).
314 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 453 F. Supp. 3d at 27 (stating the “the NEA
authorizes the President to declare [a] national emergency”).
315 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
312
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he is acting in the first of Justice Jackson’s groupings, arguing that he is
acting pursuant to the National Emergencies Act and accompanying
statutes — “express or implied authorization.”316 Further, the President
would argue, Congress had completely failed to amend or update the
National Emergencies Act and Congress taken an active role in
terminating prior emergencies — is this not evidence of a “gloss on
Executive Power.”317 Hypothetical litigants, likely from the fossil fuel
industry, would argue that the president’s powers were at the “lowest
ebb” — Congress had yet to pass climate change legislation and had not
provided explicit or implicit authority to the president to address
climate change via the Clean Air Act or other environmental statutes.318
Challenges to presidential authority will be bolstered if the President
uses his authority to seize domestic coal plants or elements of the fossil
fuel industry within the United States. But authorities such as the IEEPA
will be viewed far more favorably. Justice Jackson would “indulge the
widest latitude of interpretation” when the “instruments of national
force . . . [are] turned against the outside world.” But when this power
is “turned inward . . . it should have no such indulgence.”319
Relatedly, climate legislation and agency action on climate must also
survive judicial review. Indeed, the recent transformation of the
Supreme Court breathes life into administrative law doctrines — such
as Chevron deference320 and the nondelegation doctrine.321 This may
make it more difficult for agencies to regulate GHG emissions and
implement climate legislative achievements.322 Indeed, in the face of a
widening emissions gap and broad acceptance about climate change’s

316

Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
Id. at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
318 Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
319 Id. at 645-46 (Jackson, J., concurring).
320 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
321 The nondelegation doctrine is the principle that Congress is prohibited from
delegating its legislative power to administrative agencies. See, e.g., Pan. Refin. Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (holding that Congress violated the nondelegation doctrine
by vesting legislative powers in the President without guidelines).
322 Mark P. Nevitt, The Remaking of the Supreme Court: Implications for Climate
Change Litigation and Regulation, 42 CARDOZO L. REV. 101, 102 (2020); see, e.g., Gundy
v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019) (rejecting a challenge to the nondelegation
doctrine by a 5-3 vote). Both Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett, who were not part of this
opinion, have expressed an openness to examine the nondelegation doctrine, which
could undermine the implementation of a possible cap and trade system. See Paul v.
United States, cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019). If there is a successful
nondelegation challenge to future climate legislation, we may need to turn to existing
NEA authorities out of necessity.
317
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destabilizing impacts, emergency authorities may need to be reframed
from an extraordinary measure to a prudent, necessary one.
Outside of any Youngstown analysis, reliance on emergency powers in
the face of legislative intransigence imposes a governance cost that can
be difficult to quantify but can’t be dismissed. But in analyzing whether
to declare a climate emergency, the immense cost of doing nothing and
the temporal dimension of GHG emissions must be taken into
account.323
Finally, how can a human-exacerbated phenomenon that will last
centuries qualify as an imminent disaster?324 For one, climate
attribution science increasingly makes clear that these impacts are not
in the distant future. They are being felt today in the form of extreme
weather patterns, historic wildfires, and semi-regular flooding that was
once thought to be a once in every 500-year event. These impacts are
only getting worse each year. And climate tipping-points — such as the
devastating rupture of the Antarctic ice sheet — will have irreversible
effects that could limit our future ability to respond. Climate change’s
impacts are no longer imminent. Their impacts are already here, and we
are already paying a high cost for our collective inaction. Second, and
most importantly, climate science makes clear that the window for
climate action is already here. But it is rapidly closing. The imminence
is not just dealing with the consequences of climate change, which are
already here. It is the urgency and need to take immediate action or else
face catastrophic harm.325
C. Normative Roadmap for Climate Action
Finally, might a climate emergency unfold and in what order
should these authorities be activated? First, President Biden (or any
future president) should strongly consider affirmatively declaring a
climate emergency under the National Emergencies Act, without
initially activating any follow-on authorities. This would remain in
place for one year, with an option for follow-on renewal. Declaring a
climate emergency effectively shifts the onus back to Congress to

323 Goitein, supra note 283 (critiquing the use of a national emergency declaration
as a means to address climate change); see, e.g., Dayton & Parker, supra note 283
(arguing that President should encourage Congress to take back the power rather than
use an emergency power to take action on climate change).
324 See Martin, supra note 216, at 332-34.
325 See id. at 391-92, for an outstanding discussion of imminence in the climate
context, highlighting the need to separate risk from imminence.

654

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 55:591

take legislative action to address the climate crisis.326 Further, it
provides a powerful signal to Congress that follow-on emergency
action may be forthcoming if legislative efforts collapse. Declaring a
climate emergency is an expeditious step that “involves minimal
procedural requirements and limited opportunities for judicial
review.”327 A climate emergency also serves as a signal to the outside
world that the United States is fully committed to squarely
addressing the climate crisis. Simply declaring a climate emergency
— as thirty nations have already done — would send an important
message at home and abroad about the seriousness of the crisis and
the real potential for follow-on legal action. This will require an
intense, nuanced communications strategy to both Congress and the
public that links the climate emergency with a clear action plan.328
The President must make clear that executive action and emergency
action are not enough to solve the climate crisis, with the express
purpose of incentivizing congressional action.
Congress could then do any number of things: address climate change
via legislation or amend the emergency framework (or any one of its
authorizing statutes) to limit the power that it provides to the President.
Second, the President and his experts should make scientifically
informed decisions regarding what follow-on authorities should next be
invoked. The obvious place to start is the Defense Production Act,
which does not specifically require an emergency declaration, but
provides greater loan guarantees in the event of a national emergency.
From here, the President can potentially take follow on steps under the
Military Construction Authority to shore up climate resilient
investment at military bases and consider using the IEEPA to shine light
on the actions of climate rogue states or prohibit the import of products
from the Amazon basin. The final two climate emergency authorities —
suspension of drilling on the outer continental shelf and emergency
transportation coordination authorities — deserve far more careful
study about their efficacy and cost prior to their activation.329

326 The last time Congress attempted to pass comprehensive climate legislation
occurred in 2009, but this never left the Senate committee.
327 Farber, supra note 6, at 1172.
328 See Joseph P. Reser & Graham L. Bradley, Fear Appeals in Climate Change
Communication, CLIMATE SCI. (Sept. 26, 2017), https://oxfordre.com/climatescience/
view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228620.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228620-e-386
[https://perma.cc/QWR4-A8W7] (discussing how fear appeals can backfire if not
carefully tailored).
329 See Ewing & Kysar, supra note 192, at 363 n.36.
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Reliance on the emergency authorities outlined in Part III does not
fully solve the climate crisis.330 Nor does it by override or supplant
existing authorities within the traditional legal framework. That work
continues. What a climate emergency does is provide substantive,
supplemental authorities that work hand-in-hand with traditional legal
authorities both domestically and internationally. As the emissions gap
widens, turning to these emergency powers may not just be a prudent
exercise of existing legal authorities. It may be necessary for the
President to protect the nation and its citizens from rising temperatures
that massively destabilize the earth’s physical environment.331
Any climate emergency must be open and transparent to Congress
and the American people. My approach favors using expressly delegated
statutory powers, and disfavors reliance on inherent Article II
authorities. Congress has already provided — and largely acceded to —
particular grants of statutory power to the President “waiting in the
wings for just such a moment to arise.”332
CONCLUSION
As the World Meteorological Organization has made clear, we are in
a state of planetary emergency.333 Legal governance institutions and
domestic U.S. law have failed to take the necessary steps to combat
climate change. Emissions are rising, and we have a short window to
reverse course to lower GHG emissions. The earth, in turn, continues
to undergo a massive physical destabilization in the face of rising GHG
emissions. This destabilization will only grow over time, with the rising
potential for climate “tipping points” and “green swan” events leading
to a massive loss of life and destruction of the physical environment.334
James Speth has noted that “the surest path to widespread cultural
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See supra Part III.
See Monaghan, supra note 30, at 33-35.
332 Scheppele, supra note 139, at 857.
333 See GLOBAL CLIMATE 2020, supra note 63, at 5-7 (discussing evidence of a rising
global temperature and the associated repercussions).
334 I borrow the term “green swan” from Nassim Taleb. See NASSIM N. TALEB, THE
BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE (6th ed. 2007); see also Patrick
Bolton, Morgan Despres, Luiz Awazu Pereira da Silva, Frédéric Samama & Romain
Svartzman, The Green Swan: Central Banking and Financial Stability in the Age of Climate
Change, BANQUE DE FRANCE (2020) https://www.bis.org/publ/othp31.pdf [https://perma.cc/
HL3K-ZW8A]; Steve Zwick, Coronavirus Is Bad, but the Green Swan Is Worse, ECOSYSTEM
MARKETPLACE (Feb. 3, 2020), https://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/articles/coronavirusis-dangerous-but-the-green-swan-is-worse/ [https://perma.cc/DA3X-PAQE].
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change is a cataclysmic event that profoundly affects shared values and
delegitimizes the status quo and existing leadership.”335
The urgency is real. As is the need for innovative legal, policy, and
technological solutions. Environmentalist Bill McKibben recently
exclaimed that “the next ten years for climate change is what February
is for the coronavirus.”336
To be clear, the U.S. needs comprehensive climate legislation that
reduces our reliance on fossil-fuels and sets use on a path to shift to
renewable, sustainable energies. But tapping into emergency powers
provides additional, supplemental authorities that work hand-in-hand
with traditional legal authorities. The climate crisis forces us to look
with fresh eyes at the legal tools at our disposal. The approach outlined
in this Article actually reflects a sobering recognition of the steps needed
to take to face the climate crisis. Indeed, declaring a climate emergency
today might actually be a prudent, responsible action in the face of
climate change’s sheer magnitude and destabilizing impacts. The shortlived drop in GHG emission during the novel coronavirus crisis
demonstrates the deep, structural challenge needed to keep global
temperatures at a manageable number. It also acknowledges and
addresses a growing governance gap between what is required to
address the climate crisis and what political actors are actually doing.
While not an elixir, emergency powers can activate supplemental,
targeted authorities that help close the climate governance gap. In doing
so, we must balance the potential abuse of emergency authority with
the legitimate use of delegated emergency powers to address the
“climate crisis.” In the face of a growing emissions gap, tapping into
emergency powers to address the climate crisis should take this
dynamic into account.

335 JAMES G. SPETH, THE BRIDGE AT THE END OF THE WORLD: CAPITALISM, THE
ENVIRONMENT, AND CROSSING FROM CRISIS TO SUSTAINABILITY 211 (Yale Univ. Press 2008);
see also Martin, supra note 216, at 333-34.
336 Rachel Westrate, What Does the COVID-19 Pandemic Mean for Climate Change?,
LAWFARE (June 23, 2020, 8:01 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-does-covid-19pandemic-mean-climate-change [https://perma.cc/V76K-ZCG8] (quoting activist Bill
McKibben on Professor Noah Feldman’s podcast).

